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INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the contemporary study of comparative local
government law lies a paradox. On the one hand, the discipline relies
on an assumption that there is a great deal of similarity between
different cities across the world—an assumption evinced by adjectives
such as “global,” “international,” or “world” that scholars routinely
affix to the cities they compare.1 If no minimal baseline of
commonality is assumed, the whole exercise becomes futile. What is
the point of comparing things that have nothing in common? On the
other hand, what can be more local—as opposed to “global” or
“international”—than local government law? The local is in the
name, and for good reason. Local government law structures the
smallest-scale political institutions, those that are the closest to the
specific community. Thus inevitably this body of law reflects the
community’s particular culture and politics.
Much of local
government law is dedicated to the regulation of space: local
government law’s scope of interest, indeed its job, is parochial by
definition.
This Article suggests and pursues one method for tackling this
paradox presented by a field of law dedicated to the global attributes
of the local (or the local attributes of the global).2 The Article
explores one common, “global,” policy adopted by many cities
despite the particular, parochial nature of their local government law
regimes. The Article seeks to figure out how the particularities of the
local government legal system affect—or do not affect—a policy the
city imports from elsewhere.
The policy picked here for this exercise—bike share plans—is in
many ways highly reflective of our times. In the age of the global city,
bike share plans have become irresistible to cities throughout the
globe.3 A local bike share scheme involves placing bikes in stations
1. See infra Part I.A.
2. Social scientists refer to the phenomenon of “glocalization,” first introduced
to scholarly discussion in Roland Robertson, Glocalization: Time-Space and
Homogeneity-Heterogeneity, in GLOBAL MODERNITIES 25 (Mike Featherstone et al.
eds., 1995). The term originated as a popular business strategy in Japan, and it
implies the creation of products or services intended for the global market but
customized to suit local cultures. Id.
3. A bike share plan is the shorthand often used to describe the shared use of a
bicycle fleet. Susan Shaheen et al., Bikesharing in Europe, the Americas, and Asia:
Past, Present, and Future, 2143 TRANSP. RES. REC. 159, 159 (2010).
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spread throughout a city and inviting individuals to rent a bike at any
station and return it to another in exchange for a payment set in
accordance with the length of time during which the bike was used.4
These bike-share plans have grown extremely popular in a very short
span of time. Today Chicago’s and London’s streets are dotted with
the blue bikes forming part of Divvy and Barclays Cycle Hire,
respectively; Hangzhou’s and Mexico City’s with the red of Hangzhou
Public Bicycle and EcoBici; Buenos Aires’s and Taipei’s with the
yellow of Ecobici5 and UBike; Toronto’s and Wrocław’s with the
black of Bike Share Toronto and nextbike; Rio de Janeiro’s and
Milan’s with the orange of Bike-Rio and BikeMi; Copenhagen and
Changwon (South Korea) with the white of GoBike and Nubija.6
These cities, along with more than seven hundred of their brethren
worldwide,7 are all closely, and rapidly, following in the footsteps of
Paris’s original silver Vélib’ bikes, launched less than a decade ago, in
2007.
The almost universal rush to adopt this one uniform policy presents
itself as testament to the emergence of the global model of the
modern city. Such a city is always concerned with the same array of
problems: congestion, environmentalism, tourism, a professional
upper-middle class, and a booming center.
Consequently, it
consistently toys with the same solutions considered elsewhere for
these common concerns. In their global mold, cities thus end up
adopting identical policies—say, bike sharing—regardless of their
specific location. Still, inevitably, even for the global city, the specific
location must matter. The homogenous and homogenizing policy of
bike sharing is adopted by different legal systems—systems of local
government law that correspond to the local particularities of the
place where each operates. The result is bike share programs that,
though identical in their animating principles and goals, vary greatly
in their details.
And unlike the variance in the selected color scheme, some of the
other details in which bike share programs vary are extremely

4. See infra Part I.B.
5. Originally called mejor en bici; there is no relation to Mexico City’s EcoBici.
6. Of course, these are not the sole color options currently in use. Tel Aviv,
(Tel-O-Fun) and Bangkok (pun pun) use green, while Brussels (Villo!) and Boston
(Hubway) use silver.
7. As of July 2014, bike-share plans were in operation in 721 cities. Data
collected by MetroBike, LLC. The Bike Share World Map, GOOGLE MAPS,
https://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&om=1&msa=0&msid=10422731
8304000014160.00043d80f9456b3416ced&ll=43.580391,-42.890625&spn=143.80149,
154.6875&z=1&source=embed (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
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important. For example, they relate to the bike share’s source of
funding—public, private, or a mix of the two. They involve the plan’s
integration with other transit options. They include the mode and
level of user payments. They regard the identity of the authority
running the plan. They respect the choice of location for the bike
stations.8 As opposed to technical distinctions in number of bikes or
stations, or in the operating technology, most of these differences
cannot be written off as the mere upshot of physical disparities
between cities or the humdrum result of the disparate rollout times of
the plans. Thus, while writers and international organizations extoll
the benefits of the bike share plan as a policy suitable to all places,
necessitating little more than adjustments to the geographical layout
of the adopting city,9 in actuality the bike share plan is a prime
example of the global modified to the dictates of the local.
Many of such dictates of the local are dictates of local government
law. This Article sheds light on the mechanisms by which a local
government law system first enables the adoption of a policy of global
origins but then alters that policy to fit in with the system’s own
idiosyncratic characteristics.
In other words, this Article
demonstrates how local government law matters in the age of the
global city. To do so, this Article offers a first of its kind classification
of local government law systems.10 It thereby provides a general
service to the study of comparative local government law: it suggests a
way to analyze the most important attributes of a local government
law system, wherever it may be, and compare that system to other
systems based on comprehensive and coherent standards. Putting
local government law systems side by side in this innovative manner,
this Article examines the process by which the differences and
similarities between them affect the resultant policies they adopt; in
this particular case, the bike share policy they adopt.
Part I of this Article sets the academic and factual stage for this
exercise. It first explores the literature in the comparative local
government law field. It traces the impact that works in geography,
sociology, and economics expounding on the “world city” or “global
city” have had on legal thinking. It situates the Article among the
different strands of existing scholarly analysis and explains the
novelty and utility of its strategy of examining one policy across
different local government law systems. It then proceeds to explain

8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra note 71 (survey of existing typologies and their limits).
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why bike share plans are particularly well suited for this strategy. For
this purpose, the history and current state of bike share plans are
chronicled. Relating the reality of bike share plans to the theoretical
literature, the plans are shown to be real-world manifestations of the
academic world or global city hypothesis. Part II describes the local
legal backgrounds against which these plans, characteristic of the
world or global city, were adopted. It puts forward four axes along
which local government law systems throughout the world differ, and
places those systems on different spots along those axes. Specifically,
the axes Part II isolates are: the relationship between the city and the
state (patterns of local empowerment); the relationship between the
city and other local governments (patterns of local fragmentation);
the relationship between the city and entities located below it
(patterns of micro-localism); and the relationship within the city
government (patterns of separation of powers). This categorization
of local government law systems is then employed in Part III to
explain similarities and dissimilarities between bike share plans
disparate cities adopted. Specifically, Part III focuses on three key
elements of a bike share plan: process of adoption, funding scheme,
and choice of location for bike docking stations. Finally, Part IV
draws avenues for future research based on the Article’s framework
and discusses the limitations of the framework—and of comparative
local government law in general.
Independent of those limitations to be discussed at the analysis’s
conclusion, two caveats must be acknowledged at the outset. First,
this Article offers a case study of one policy: bike share plans. While,
as will be explained, that policy is particularly useful for the Article’s
theoretical purposes, no one would argue that it is the most important
policy cities are currently adopting.
Contemporary cities are
confronted with grave social and economic challenges often left
unaddressed by timid or impotent higher levels of governments.
Cities must respond to rapid social change, transformation in
production, extreme inequality, budget shortfalls, informal
settlements, vagaries of a globalized real estate market,
unprecedented urban growth, and more. The importance of bike
share plans pales in comparison. We do not argue otherwise. We do
believe, however, that the nature of a bike share plan as a low-stakes
affair allows a useful exercise in comparative local government law.
More contested policies face much more of an uphill battle before
they can be adopted, and thus their spread is more checked in place
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and pace.11 As a result, it is often impractical to seek a comparison of
cities’ adoption of one policy that is highly impactful.
We hope that at least to a limited extent the conclusions derived
from the experience of this Article’s low stakes policy can later on be
generalized to other policies. Inarguably, however, there is a second
caveat standing in the way of any such generalization. In its analysis
of bike share plans, this Article mentions many cities, but focuses
primarily on a limited number of them. Those are Paris, London,
New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Mexico City, Buenos Aires,
Montréal, Shanghai, and Tel Aviv. These cities were picked because
they answered three needs. First, and obviously, they all have
prominent bike share plans. Second, they are all “global/world cities”
of some, at least lowly rank, or aspirants at that status; thus they are
suitable candidates for a study of patterns of behavior among global
cities.12 Third, and perhaps most important, these cities represent a
wide geographic range that allows for a variety of legal systems:
common law and civil law; federal and unitary; centralized and
decentralized. Having said that, there is little doubt that other cities
and legal systems would have offered additional differentiation.
Furthermore, there is nothing inherently more interesting, or
consequential, about these cities (or global cities in general) as
compared to any other city. Nevertheless, the contours of any one
article are limited, and a choice had to be made. We remain
confident that since this choice was made in an informed manner, the
argument, though inevitably somewhat weakened, is not ineffectual.
I. BACKGROUND: THE THEORY OF THE GLOBAL CITY AND THE
POLICY OF BIKE SHARING
This Article aims at intervening in the comparative local
government law literature through an exploration of bike share plans.
For that purpose, it is imperative to review the existing literature in
the field of comparative local government law, and explain why an
analysis of bike share plans can aid in addressing its shortcomings.
This introductory Part will engage that task by first reviewing the
relevant academic literature in the field and then presenting bike
share plans. In this manner the stage will be set for the following
Parts’ investigation which will draw, from the specific case of bike

11. See, e.g., infra note 184 and accompanying text.
12. Social scientists agree that there are different tiers of global cities. See infra
Part I.A.
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shares, conclusions benefitting the broader comparative local
government literature.
A. The Global City and Comparative Local Government Law
The Introduction lists many cities from disparate parts of the
world—London, Shanghai, New York, Rio de Janeiro, and others—
assuming they have much in common. This move is far from
audacious, or particularly original. We are living in the era of the
global or world city, where, as sociologists, economists, and urban
planners remind us, New York shares more with London and Rio de
Janeiro than it does with Buffalo and Cleveland.13 The ensuing brief
literature review surveys some of the main social science works that
introduced the concept of the global or world city and summarizes
their effect on scholarship in local government law.
The terms “world city” and “global city” entered the lexicon in the
closing years of the twentieth century. In 1986, John Friedmann
introduced the “world city hypothesis,”14 and in 1991 Saskia Sassen
Their key insight was that
wrote of a new “global city.”15
developments of the past few decades produced a new global
hierarchy of places, at the apex of which rest “world cities,” or “global
cities.”16 These cities serve as key nodes or command posts that
exercise power over other cities in the system and the world economy
as a whole. Specifically, the nature of late twentieth-century financial
globalization elevated the status of those cities where the finance and
specialized services industry was located.17
Friedmann’s work focused mainly on the resulting hierarchical
relationship between cities.18 It thereby engendered a body of

13. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, Introduction to GLOBAL NETWORKS, LINKED CITIES
1, 25–31 (Saskia Sassen ed., 2002) (arguing that cities have grown increasingly
decoupled from their regions and nations as they become more deeply embedded in
international networks).
14. John Friedmann, The World City Hypothesis, 17 DEV. & CHANGE 69, 70
(1986).
15. See SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (1991).
16. The developments identified in these works were in fact predicted decades
earlier. Stephen Hymer, The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven
Development, in ECONOMICS AND WORLD ORDER 113, 114 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed.,
1972).
17. SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 3–4 (2nd
ed. 2000); Friedmann, supra note 14, at 70–77.
18. See, e.g., John Friedmann, Where We Stand: A Decade of World City
Research, in WORLD CITIES IN A WORLD-SYSTEM 21, 41 (Paul L. Knox and Peter J.
Taylor eds., 1995).
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literature aiming at ranking the globe’s world cities.19 Sassen
concentrated more on the effect a city’s global status carries for the
city itself. She argued that the same processes that have granted the
global city prominence in the world economy have also restructured
the city’s own social and economic order and “thus a new type of city
has appeared.”20 All global cities “have undergone massive and
parallel changes in their economic base, spatial organization, and
social structure.”21
Sassen posited that the cause for the otherwise bewildering parallel
developments in cities set apart by culture and history are
transformations in the world economy. As economic activities
become more dispersed across national borders, the task of managing
them becomes more complex, and, consequently, large global firms
outsource many management tasks to highly specialized service firms
(e.g.,
accounting,
legal
consulting,
public
relations,
telecommunications). These service firms are exceedingly similar in
their mode of operation, regardless of their location, and they
congregate together in certain cities since they are subject to
“agglomeration economies.”22
This concept of “agglomeration economies,” mostly developed by
economists, occupies a key position in the academic study of cities
today.23 The basic principle of agglomeration economics is that the
presence of a certain person or firm has positive externalities: it
generates effects that benefit others, who therefore desire to be in the
vicinity of the person or firm. Agglomeration economists identify
these effects, quantify them, and model the way in which they operate
and dictate locational decisions. The agglomeration effects normally
acknowledged include knowledge spillovers,24 economizing on
transportation costs,25 and the opportunities offered by diversity (e.g.

19. E.g., Carl Abbott, The International City Hypothesis: An Approach to the
Recent History of U.S. Cities. 24 J. URB. HIST. 28 (1997); Arthur S. Alderson & Jason
Beckfield, Power and Position in the World City System, 109 AM. J. SOC. 811 (2004);
David A. Smith & Michael Timberlake, Conceptualising and Mapping the Structure
of the World’s City System, 32 URB. STUD. 287 (1995).
20. SASSEN, supra note 15, at 4.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 3–7.
23. E.g., EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL
EQUILIBRIUM 1–12 (2008); see David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic
Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1515–16 (2010).
24. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1127
(1992) (discussing intra-industry information spillovers).
25. MASAHISA FUJITA ET AL., THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1999).

AND
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of workers, consumption goods, or even dating prospects).26 Most
writers do not doubt the positive impact of these effects, and thus
they tend to be bullish on the prospects of cities, which are the places
where agglomeration effects are exploited. So much so that the
economist Edward Glaeser chose to title his book Triumph of the
City.27
Demographic data lends support to such sentiments, as cities
worldwide have been experiencing rapid growth.28 Particularly in the
case of global cities in the developed world, however, this growth is
not merely the product of economic factors, but also of changes in
cultural preferences.29 These are highlighted by sociologists and
scholars of urban studies. Drawing on Jane Jacobs’s seminal book,
The Death and Life of Great American Cities,30 researchers elaborate
on the appeal of the urban lifestyle.31 Citing phenomena that are
common to cities worldwide, such as gentrification, they argue that
middle- and upper-middle class individuals and families who decades
ago would have been partial to the suburbs now prefer to stay in, or

26. RICHARD FLORIDA, WHO’S YOUR CITY?: HOW THE CREATIVE ECONOMY IS
MAKING WHERE TO LIVE THE MOST IMPORTANT DECISION OF YOUR LIFE 243 (2008)
(dating); BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS 17–18 (2005) (consumption);
Daron Acemoglu, A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in Human
Capital Accumulation, 111 Q. J. ECON. 779, 77981 (1996) (labor).
27. EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST INVENTION
MADE US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER (2011).
28. The World Health Organization reports that:
Today, the number of urban residents is growing by nearly 60 million every
year. The global urban population is expected to grow roughly 1.5% per
year, between 2025–2030. By the middle of the 21st century, the urban
population will almost double, increasing from approximately 3.4 billion in
2009 to 6.4 billion in 2050.
Urban Population Growth, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/gho/urban_
health/situation_trends/urban_population_growth_text/en/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
29. In developed countries, such as the United States, the phenomenon of urban
growth manifests itself through a reversal of the historical trend whereby suburbs
grew at the expense of the central cities. In 2011, for the first time in almost a
century, the major cities of America’s largest metropolitan areas grew faster than
their combined suburbs. William H. Frey, Demographic Reversal: Cities Thrive,
Suburbs Sputter, BROOKINGS INST. (June 29, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/
research/opinions/2012/06/29-cities-suburbs-frey.
30. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
31. See, e.g., LARRY BENNETT, THE THIRD CITY: CHICAGO AND AMERICAN
URBANISM 115–46 (2010); SULEIMAN OSMAN, THE INVENTION OF BROWNSTONE
BROOKLYN: GENTRIFICATION AND THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTICITY IN POSTWAR
NEW YORK 233–69 (2011); SHARON ZUKIN, NAKED CITY: THE DEATH AND LIFE OF
AUTHENTIC URBAN PLACES 219–46 (2010).

132

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

return to, the central city.32 This taste for the city is the product of
cultural forces felt across regions, countries, and continents.
Everywhere, affluent people seek the cultural activities, the shopping
options, the diversity of experiences and encounters, the reduced
reliance on cars, and the denser built environment, that major cities
proffer.
Since both firms seeking to take advantage of agglomeration
economies and the individuals moving into the city to enjoy its
cultural offerings, bring money into the city, they are highly desirable
from the perspective of the city.33 Hence some of the global city
scholarly literature has taken a markedly prescriptive turn. While
Friedmann and Sassen focused on detecting, and sometimes even
criticizing, the processes leading to the emergence of the world or
global city, many succeeding writers have tried to present a roadmap
for becoming a world or global city.34 If the new hubs of economic
activity are at heart identical products of parallel developments, as
Friedmann and Sassen hypothesized, there is, succeeding writers
contend, a common way for some cities to become such hubs—
regardless of their geographical, historical, cultural, and national
backgrounds.
For several writers and reformers, this effort at urban
transformation has a clear legal component. If global cities are
becoming more alike, and if there is a uniform prescription for
success as a city, the menu of effective legal regimes a city must
choose from is also limited.35 When this line of reasoning is pursued
further, ideas emerge regarding a model local government law to
which global cities are organically attracted or, if that is not the case,
which they should proactively pursue.
32. See NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE
REVANCHIST CITY 189–209 (1996) (providing an overview of the gentrification’s
causes and effects on different cities); see also Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner

City: Class Transformation, Concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of the
Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 12–15 (2006) (noting both the economic and
social factors driving the migration of the affluent back into cities); Michael E. Porter,
The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1995, at
55, 57–62.
33. See Gerald Frug, Designing Government, in THE ENDLESS CITY 298, 304
(Ricky Burdett & Deyan Sudjic eds., 2010) (inspecting the way in which government
officials in cities seek to promote their global city status); MARK SCHNEIDER, THE
COMPETITIVE CITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA 125–26 (1989).
34. E.g., FLORIDA, supra note 26; GLAESER, supra note 23.
35. But see Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L.
REV. 1837, 1887 (2010) (arguing that major global cities have ascended to that status
not thanks to their legal structure, but because structural changes in the economy
favor them).
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Some legal writers now argue that local government law systems
are converging: national legal systems that historically diverged in
their rules regarding cities are succumbing to the homogenizing forces
engulfing the world or global city.36 Works in this vein may be more
explicitly prescriptive in nature. For example, writers have argued
that cities should copycat effective land use regimes adopted by other
cities;37 others have advocated further decentralization based on the
success of diverse local government law systems that have
implemented such schemes.38 This mantle has also been assumed by
key international organizations that began adding decentralization,
urban practices, and local government law to the repertoire of prodevelopment policies they propagate. The United Nations, for
example, has been affiliated with a series of initiatives meant to
promote good governance practices for cities. These suggested
practices entail certain modes of local decision-making processes as
well as sustainable policies respecting the environment, social
concerns, transportation, economic development, and more.39 The
United Nations similarly endorsed a “Best Practices and Local
Leadership Programme,” which defines itself as “a global network of
government agencies, local authorities and their associations,
professional and academic institutions and grassroots organizations

36. E.g., Robert J. Bennett, Local Government in Europe: Common Directions of
Change, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NEW EUROPE 1, 1–20 (Robert J. Bennett ed.,
1993); PETER JOHN, LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE (2001) (concluding
that many European countries are reforming their local government laws in a similar
way, replacing the idea of traditional government with a multi-dimensional notion of
governance); Hellmut Wollmann, Local Government Systems: From Historic

Divergence Towards Convergence? Great Britain, France, and Germany as
Comparative Cases in Point, 18 ENV’T PLAN. C: GOV’T POL’Y 33 (2000).
37. Matthew A. Light, Note, Different Ideas of the City: Origins of Metropolitan
Land-Use Regimes in the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, 24 YALE J. INT’L
L. 577 (1999), reprinted in COMPARATIVE URBAN PLANNING LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPARING THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER NATIONS 24 (James
A. Kushner ed., 2003).
38. PANEL ON URBAN POPULATION DYNAMICS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
CITIES TRANSFORMED: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD 401–06 (Mark R. Montgomery et al. eds., 2003). But see
Schragger, supra note 35, at 1901–07.
39. UN-Habitat regularly publishes reports striving at this goal. E.g. UNHABITAT, A NEW STRATEGY OF SUSTAINABLE NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING: FIVE
PRINCIPLES (2013); UN-HABITAT, CONSTRUCCIÓN DE CIUDADES MÁS EQUITATIVAS:
POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS PARA LA INCLUSIÓN EN AMÉRICA LATINA (2014); UN-HABITAT,
PLANNING AND DESIGN FOR SUSTAINABLE URBAN MOBILITY (2013).
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dedicated to the identification and exchange of successful solutions
for sustainable development.”40
Such policy moves have led David Barron and Gerald Frug to
argue that legal scholarship should recognize not only a field of
comparative local government law, but also a field of international
local government law. International local government law is stirred
by the insight that cities have grown into meaningful international
actors. While technically cities have never been a subject of
international law, local government law is now intertwined with
international law. As already seen, cities have become a topic of
interest for key actors in international law, such as the United
Nations, who generate laws, or proposed laws, that at least indirectly
affect the structure of national-level local government laws. At the
same time, cities themselves interfere in world affairs: they form
international networks among themselves and sometimes even
formulate municipal foreign policies.41
Like the comparative local government law literature highlighting
the convergence of different legal systems, the new body of work
dealing with international local government law is motivated by a
belief that globalization has, at least somewhat, changed the nature
and diversity of traditional local government law regimes. Other
authors in comparative local government law remain skeptical,
however, and cling to a more traditional view of the relationship
between different local government law systems. They argue that
local government law systems may face similar external pressures due
to globalization, but the outcomes of these new clashes are mostly
characterized not by convergence of legal policies across national
systems, but rather by divergence. For example, writers have
researched the very divergent reactions of local governments faced
with similar problems of competition for economic development,42 a

40. Best Practices and Local Leadership Programme, UN-HABITAT,
http://mirror.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=34 (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
41. See Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law,
38 URB. LAW. 1, 2 (2006); see also Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875, 875–76 (2006) (making similar arguments about the changing
legal status of cities). For examples of the application of the international local
government law framework to specific policy fields, see Keith Aoki et al., (In)visible
Cities: Three Local Government Models and Immigration Regulation, 10 OR. REV.
INT’L L. 453 (2008) (immigration); Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale
of Networks?: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409, 414–15 (2008)
(climate change).
42. See, e.g., H. V. SAVITCH & PAUL KANTOR, CITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
MARKETPLACE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH
AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE (2004).
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post-industrial age,43 informal housing,44 or globalization trends in
general.45
More traditional nation-by-nation surveys of local
government law also often highlight the enduring differences between
local government law systems.46
This Article’s analysis draws on the key insights of all these strands
of current literature—the non-legal global city literature, the
international local government law literature, the comparative local
government law literature highlighting the convergence of systems,
the comparative local government law literature highlighting the
divergence of systems, and the surveys of laws—while employing a
research method that is somewhat different from that most often
suggested by any of them. To explain how this Article differs from
existing works it is necessary to present the actual policy of bike share
plans on which the Article focuses and see the way in which it reflects
the different theoretical insights of the existing academic approaches
just reviewed.
B.

Bike Share Plans

In a world teeming and obsessed with innovation, one of the
hottest topics of the last few years has been the sharing economy.47
Appealing to ideas of conservation, efficiency, self-sufficiency, and
participation, all the while combining grassroots ingenuity and
cooperation on the one hand with opportunities opened by
technological advances and international entrepreneurs on the other,
the sharing of commodities is an almost irresistible proposition. Over
the past year alone, extremely successful services for the sharing of

43. See, e.g., JEFFERY M. SELLERS, GOVERNING FROM
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 37–89 (2002).
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44. See, e.g., ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (Edésio Fernandes & Ann Varley eds., 1998).
45. See LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A GLOBAL WORLD: AUSTRALIA AND CANADA IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly & John F. Martin eds., 2010).
46. See, e.g., COMPARING LOCAL GOVERNANCE: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
(Bas Denters & Lawrence E. Rose eds., 2005); LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE:
THE ‘FOURTH LEVEL’ IN THE EU MULTILAYERED SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE (Carlo
Panara & Michael Varney eds., 2013).
47. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, Welcome to the ‘Sharing Economy’, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/friedman-welcometo-the-sharing-economy.html; Rebecca Smithers, More Than a Third of Britons
Embrace
the
Sharing
Economy,
GUARDIAN,
June
13,
2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/jun/13/third-of-britons-embrace-sharingeconomy; The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-risesharing-economy.
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car rides and accommodations have not only gained record numbers
of users (and investors) but also found themselves embroiled in fierce
legislative and judicial battles.48 These services desire to harness for
economic efficiency and gains a simple fact of life: there are some
commodities we own but do not need or use all the time—be it our
cars, our homes, or even our time. Hence it will be beneficial for us if
in those downtimes we could lend those commodities to others who
need to use them just then. The new sharing services are meant to
broker such deals: to match a user to a good—a car, a room, a
person’s time—that is not being used at that specific time. Simple as
it is, the idea is also revolutionary. It upends traditional notions of
ownership and unsettles not only the owner’s role, but also the
market position of traditional market participants who rely on those
traditional notions—hence the battles in courts and legislatures.
The revolutionary sharing services, which different branches of
government need now assess, were actually predated by a sharing
service introduced by governments themselves: bike shares. Bike
share plans are premised on the idea animating all sharing services: a
user of a bike need not own it. Thus a bike share plan permits the
user to pick a bike, which she does not own, at a docking station, ride
it to her destination, and return the bike. Such programs were first
proposed decades before the introduction of the technologies that

48. For example, Uber, the car-share service, completed a funding round in June
2014 that valued the company at $18.2 billion (among the highest valuations ever).
Evelyn M. Rusli & Douglas MacMillan, Uber Gets an Uber-Valuation, WALL ST. J.,
June 6, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-gets-uber-valuation-of-18-2-billion1402073876. In the preceding funding round, held only ten months earlier, Uber was
valued at $3.4 billion. Dan Primack, More Details on Uber’s Massive Funding
Round, FORTUNE (Aug. 23, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/08/23/more-details-onubers-massive-funding-round/. It now operates in 171 cities in forty-four countries.
UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities (last visited Sept. 20, 2014). In many of those
cities and others, legal challenges to its operation have been raised. For example, in
Chicago, after the city adopted an ordinance to regulate the service’s activity, the
Illinois legislature hastened to pass its own more restrictive bill, in reply to lobbying
efforts by the taxi industry. H.B. 4075, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014). In
August, Chicago governor Pat Quinn vetoed House Bill 4075. Press Release, Ill.
Gov’t News Network, Governor Quinn Vetoes Uber Bill (Aug. 25, 2014), available at
http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=2&RecNu
m=12553. The legal battle in Chicago is not unique. See, e.g., Ingrid Pan, Why Uber
Faces Problems with Regulation and Existing Services, MARKET REALIST (June 23,
2014), https://marketrealist.com/2014/06/ubers-problems-regulation-existing-services/
(“In Brussels, for instance, Uber could face fines of up to 10,000 euros for offering
fares to drivers without an official taxi license. In Germany, the Berlin Taxi
Association won an injunction against Uber that could prohibit the company from
operating there . . . . In Virginia, Uber received a cease and desist letter from the
Virginia DMV.”).

2014] COMPARATIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 137
facilitate the current rise of the sharing economy in bikes and other
commodities.
In 1965, a member of Amsterdam’s city council proposed that
20,000 bikes be distributed for use in the central city. The proposal
was summarily dismissed by the city council. Nonetheless, volunteers
painted fifty bicycles white and distributed them in the city center for
public use. Most of these bikes quickly disappeared.49 The next
major bike plans, adopted decades later, began to address this
problem of bike theft. In 1993, La Rochelle in France and Cambridge
in England made bicycles available for public use, but required users
to show some form of identification and leave a deposit to prevent
theft.50 The effectiveness of these plans was still limited since by and
large they required lenders to return bikes to the same station from
which they were picked up.51
The bike share plans prevalent today have exploited technological
advances to address the two problems that plagued their
predecessors: theft of bicycles and the rigidity of station locations.
The birthplace of the contemporary plans is France, where the city of
Rennes was the first to introduce a smart-card technology bike-share
system in 1998 (appropriately, Rennes’s system became known as
Vélo à la carte [“bike by card”]). Rennes was followed soon
thereafter by France’s second largest city, Lyon, whose Vélo’v system
then served as the model for Paris.52 Launched in 2007 with 20,600
bikes at 1451 stations,53 Paris’s Vélib’ was the first bike share plan
adopted by a major global city, and it is thus often, and correctly,
viewed as the trailblazer for the world’s other major bike share plans.
The modern Vélib’-style bike share plan is characterized by a
system of stations dispersed throughout the city, in which bicycles are
docked. Any prospective user can register herself in advance or at a
station—using a credit card (in Europe and America) or identification

49. INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, THE BIKE-SHARE PLANNING GUIDE 19
(2014). Ironically, the bikes that were not stolen were impounded by police who
claimed that unlocked bikes incited theft. Id.
50. Inst. for Transp. & Dev. Policy, Seven World-Class Cities Are Riding Tall in
MASS
TRANSIT
(Dec.
5,
2013),
the
Bike-Share
Boom,
http://www.masstransitmag.com/press_release/11264001/seven-world-class-cities-areriding-tall-in-the-bike-share-boom.
51. Id.
52. Paul DeMaio, Bike Sharing: History, Impacts, Models of Provision, and
Future, 12 J. PUB. TRANS. 41, 42–43 (2009).
53. NYC DEP’T CITY PLANNING, BIKE-SHARE: OPPORTUNITIES IN NEW YORK
CITY 21 (2009).
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card (mostly in China, but also in Buenos Aires)54—and remove a
bike from the station, use it, and then re-dock it at any station that
forms part of the city’s scheme.
At the time of writing this Article, about 600 cities around the
world have adopted a bike-share plan.55 They count among them
most of the cities commonly referred to as world or global cities (of
different ranks): Berlin, New York City, Kyoto, London, Barcelona,
Shanghai, Moscow, São Paulo, Dubai, Toronto, Bangkok, and the
aforementioned Paris. In the United States alone, the number of
shared bikes doubled during the first half of 2013 and is projected to
double once again by the end of 2014, when about 37,000 publicly
shared bicycles will be introduced onto the streets of American
cities.56
The appeal of bike share plans to cities around the globe is easy to
grasp. As cities keep growing, the congestion problems they face
become ever more dire. A bike-share plan is one relatively cheap
tool to deal with urban congestion since it takes cars off the road. It
puts on bikes commuters who otherwise would have been in cars,57
due to their practical inability to own a bike (a problem faced mostly
by visitors), or the absence of storage room for the bike in their
residences or of bike parking options at their destinations.58 By
thereby decreasing the number of cars on the road, the bike share
plan reduces pollution and hence it is also environmentally attractive.
It promises similar positive effects on the health of residents who will
engage in physical activity (which carries mental benefits as well).59
These tangible benefits are not the sole elements at play when
cities decide to adopt bike share plans. Perhaps even more
pronounced are the abstract benefits. A bike share plan “improves a

54. See INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49, at 20; see also Qué es el
Sistema Ecobici?, BUENOS AIRES CIUDAD, http://ecobici.buenosaires.gob.ar/sistemade-transporte-publico-en-bicicletas/inscripcionsist/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (Arg.).
55. See INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49, at 10.
56. Janet Larsen, Data Highlights: U.S. Bike-Sharing Fleet More than Doubles in
2013, EARTH POL’Y INST. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.earth-policy.org/data_
highlights/2013/highlights40.
57. LDA CONSULTING, CAPITAL BIKESHARE 2011 MEMBER SURVEY: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, at ii (June 14, 2012) (noting that based on responses to a November 2011
survey, DC’s bikeshare reduced miles driven per year by about five million).
58. Bike storage and parking problems were identified as key deterrents to the
use of bikes in Paris prior to its adoption of the Vélib plan. INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV.
POLICY, supra note 49, at 18.
59. OBIS, OPTIMISING BIKE SHARING IN EUROPEAN CITIES: A HANDBOOK 41
(2011) (“Just 20 minutes of cycling a day has a noticeable, positive effect on health.”).
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city’s image and branding,”60 and, accordingly, one booster
organization concludes: “[b]ike-share, more than any other form of
urban transport, has the ability to improve and transform our
cities . . . . As more cities consider bike-share, cities and streets are
once again becoming dynamic places for people and not just cars.”61
Bike share plans are thus the quintessential global city policy.
They were adopted in quick succession throughout the world, in
different countries and continents, since diverse major cities are
facing similar economic and demographic pressures that generate
almost identical urban and environmental problems. These diverse
major cities must address these problems in a way that will satisfy
similar cultural tastes and preferences. These cities emulated each
other: they followed the lead of one city, Paris, whose solution for a
problem common to its peers satisfied the tastes of global cities.
Foreign city leaders visited Paris, were impressed by its program, and
vowed to implement their own versions.62 To do so many of them
have purchased equipment and services from the same publicly
backed company originally established to implement Montreal’s bike
share.63 Paris’s lead was irresistible since global cities learn from the
successes of each other, but also feel like competitors, who must
hasten to adopt their fellows’ successful policies in order to maintain
their status. Thus, for example, Mexico City boasted of its role as a
pioneer of North America in bike sharing,64 and Buenos Aires

60. INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49, at 16.
61. Id. at 141.
62. Diane Cardwell, In Paris, Bloomberg Eyes Bike Program for Home, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30/nyregion/30mayor.html;
Ben Russel, Livingstone Plan for Street-Corner Cycle Hire Stands, INDEPENDENT,
Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/livingstone-planfor-streetcorner-cycle-hire-stands-781025.html (reporting the Mayor of London’s
announcement of implementation of a Paris-style plan, and of denouncements by his
challenger, and subsequent successor, arguing that the introduced plan was not
reflective enough of the Paris program); Eyal Tzaum, Tel-O-Fun Kids: Larishona—
Meyzam Haskarot Ophanaim Leyeladim [Tel-O-Fun Kids: For the First Time—
Venture of Renting Bikes to Kids], GLOBES, June 24, 2014 (Isr.) (reporting that Paris
was the model that Tel Aviv’s leaders followed in promoting the city’s bike share).
63. Bixi serves, in different capacities, the bike-share plans of London, Madrid,
Chicago, New York, and Melbourne, among other cities. It filed for bankruptcy in
January 2014, and has since been acquired by a Quebec businessman. See Ian Austen
& Matt Flegenheimer, Canadian Bankruptcy Court Clears the Way for Furniture
Executive to Buy Bike Share Company, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/12/business/canadian-bankruptcy-court-clears-theway-for-furniture-executive-to-buy-bike-share-company.html.
64. SECRETARÍA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE, GOBIERNO DEL DISTRITO FEDERAL,
ESTRATEGIA DE MOVILIDAD EN BICICLETA DE LA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO [BIKE SHARE
STRATEGY OF MEXICO CITY] 27 (2012) (Mex.), available at http://martha.org.mx/una-
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announced its bike share plan by naming other “great” cities that
already had one.65
Bike share plans reflect nicely not only the theoretical insights of
the global city literature, reviewed in the preceding section, but also
the trends detected by the scholars promoting the idea of
international local government law, reviewed there as well. A myriad
of international actors advocate the bike share plan to local
governments. Professional, research, and trade organizations, such as
the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, and the
Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, publish
manuals and guides for cities in order to persuade them to adopt a
plan and then facilitate the planning process.66 Non-professional
international actors are also proselytizing. The Economist declared,
“[j]ust as mass public transport changed the development of cities’
suburbs, bike-hire schemes are now shaping cities’ centres in subtle
ways . . . . Time for more of the world to go Dutch.”67 Even more
importantly, both the United Nations and the European Union have
funded reports extolling the benefits of bike shares for cities, and
detailing recommendations for implementing a plan.68

politica-con-causa/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/10-Estrategia-Movilidad-enBicicleta.pdf. The plan’s website announces: “on February 16, 2010, Mexico City
joins the list of most innovative cities, becoming the first city in Latin America that
integrates this means of public transport.” What is ECOBICI?, ECOBICI,
https://www.ecobici.df.gob.mx/informacion-del-servicio/que-es-ecobici (last visited
Oct. 4, 2014).
65. “[The bicycle program of Buenos Aires] is in line with global trends. The
great cities of the world, like Paris, New York, Barcelona, and Bogotá, have already
adopted it as a strategic partner to alleviate the transit problem and for a city of
sustainable
practices.”
Ecobici,
BUENOS
AIRES
CIUDAD,
http://ecobici.buenosaires.gob.ar (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (Arg.). Cities use bike
share plans to compare their relative standing to that of other cities even after the
plan is adopted.
Thus, for example, in Chicago officials were consoling
commentators lamenting the plan’s limited size as compared to that employed by
New York by highlighting the lead the city holds over Denver and Minneapolis. Ted
Cox, Why Chicago’s Divvy Trails New York’s Citi Bike-Sharing Program, DNAINFO
CHI., July 30, 2014, http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140730/downtown/whychicagos-divvy-lags-far-behind-new-yorks-citi-bike-sharing-program.
66. See, e.g., INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49; OLIVIER RICHARD
& THOMAS JOUANNO, BIKE SHARING SYSTEMS: PART OF PUBLIC POLICIES ON
SUSTAINABLE MOBILITY (2014), available at http://tra2014.traconference.eu/papers/
pdfs/TRA2014_Fpaper_16430.pdf; Shaheen et al., supra note 3, at 159.
67. How Do Bike-Sharing Schemes Shape Cities?, ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/10/economist-explains-14.
68. See, e.g., Sebastian Bührmann, NICHES, NEW SEAMLESS MOBILITY
SERVICES, PUBLIC BICYCLES, available at http://www.nybikeshare.org/file_download/
NICHES_public_bikes.pdf; U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, BICYCLESHARING SCHEMES: ENHANCING SUSTAINABLE MOBILITY IN URBAN AREAS (2011),
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As the product of pressures facing major cities worldwide and of
international patterns of interaction between world cities, bike share
plans are the global city, and international local government law, in
action. Accordingly, they are ideal candidates for a comparative
analysis aiming to track the policy manifestations of the theoretical
insights regarding the global city. Bike share plans enable a form of
inquiry heretofore neglected. Works about the global city and about
international local government law do not inspect specific common
policies cities individually adopt.69 Comparative local government
law, in all its current incarnations, also mostly misses these: the
convergence literature focuses on overall structural changes in local
government law systems, and the divergence literature downplays
common policies. Thus a gap exists in the literature, waiting to be
filled by studies of common local policies.
A close examination of one policy that was adopted by cities
operating under different local government law regimes should
generate conclusions regarding the enduring, or fading, impact of
local legal regimes on city action in the age of the global city. How
did this uniform policy, the bike share plan, overcome different legal
regimes? Why did the variations among legal systems not matter?
Or maybe they did matter, and the uniform policy is not quite the
uniform policy it appears to be?
II. A TYPOLOGY OF DIFFERENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
SYSTEMS
To answer these questions, the key attributes of a local government
law regime that separate different cities must first be identified so that
later the ways in which these attributes affect the resultant bike share
plans can be explored. Bike share plans reflect the intersection
between the homogenizing drive of the forces put in place by the
global city, as presented in Part I of the Article, and the peculiarities
of particular local government law regimes, to which this Part turns.

available at http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/csd-19/Background-Paper8P.Midgley-Bicycle.pdf.
69. International local government law is interested in tracing the process by
which international norms and standards are locally adopted and enforced. Blank,
supra note 41, at 922–26. The problem is that examples of such local adoption of
global norms are hard to pinpoint since the local adopting agents often refrain from
making the international influence explicit. Id. at 925. Analyzing the adoption of a
policy, rather than a norm, overcomes this problem. This is particularly true for the
case of a policy such as bike-shares, because, as noted, local agents adopting the
policy often explicitly acknowledge the influence of specific global forces.
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Local government law regimes, like law systems in general, differ in
many variables. It would be impossible for this Part to provide a
comprehensive review of all that legally sets apart the cities that have
adopted bike share plans. Cities are distinct in their legal powers and
responsibilities, institutional structure, financial capabilities, and
political role. Furthermore, cities operate within disparate systems of
public and private law, which inevitably contain many provisions that,
while not directly set forth for local governments (and hence not
intuitively perceived as falling within the realm of “local government
law”), sketch the landscape for their action.70 Thus in approaching
the goals of this Part of the Article, much modesty is needed. This
Part aims at surveying the legal regimes of different cities that have
adopted bike-share plans, yet it addresses itself to certain legal
attributes alone. There is little doubt that focusing solely on several
elements of the legal system hampers the ability to understand its
operation, and, in this Article’s specific case, its capacity for enabling,
molding, and maintaining a bike share program. Thus the analysis
presented in this Article has its inherent, and inevitable, limits.
This Article aims to alleviate this detrimental effect by pinpointing,
in an informed manner, the specific attributes of a local government
law system that can be deemed most basic. Indeed, the contribution
made by this Article, and this Part in particular, to the literature in
the field, extends beyond its insights dealing with one specific
policy—bike share plans—precisely because of this effort at detecting
a legal system’s basic attributes. This Part offers a reasoned typology
of the most salient elements of a local government law system that
should allow better comparisons of cities.71 Since, as we will argue,

70. For an example from “private” law, consider the tort of nuisance, which
regulates competing land uses. For an example from “public” law, consider the
constitutional protection for property rights, which sets the contours for any local
regulation.
71. The few existing typologies of local government law systems are very useful
for certain purposes, but too often they lack sufficient detail and legal sophistication.
They mostly distinguish systems based solely on the range of their powers, sometimes
broken down into functional responsibilities, discretion, and access. These studies
highlight the wide range of functions assigned to local government in Northern, but
not Southern, European systems. See, e.g., Edward C. Page & Michael J. Goldsmith,
Centre and Locality: Explaining Crossnational Variation, in CENTRAL AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WEST EUROPEAN
UNITARY STATES 156, 156–63 (Edward C. Page & Michael J. Goldsmith eds., 1987);
JOHN, supra note 36. At most, this distinction is supplemented by a distinction
between systems that endow local governments with general functional competence
and those that limit their powers to those specifically granted by the state level
government. Joachim Jens Hesse & Lawrence J. Sharpe, Local Government in
International Perspective: Some Comparative Observations, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT
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the major elements of any local government law system rotate around
the specific axes of difference singled out in this Part, placing a given
system on each of them will greatly facilitate an understanding of a
city’s legal capabilities, dynamics, and limitations.
This Part identifies and reviews four axes, along which local
government law regimes might differ: the local government’s
relationship with the state (or patterns of local empowerment); the
local government’s relationship with other local governments (or
patterns of local fragmentation); the local government’s relationship
with entities located below it (or patterns of micro-localism); and the
relationship within the local government (or patterns of local
separation of powers).
Respecting each of these four key
relationships defining a local government law system, this Part
discerns, and elaborates on, the different approaches a legal system
may adopt.
A. The Local Government’s Relationship with the State
The most basic issue a designer of any tiered system of government
must address is the manner in which powers are allocated between
the different tiers of government. All the legal systems reviewed
assume that the local level of government is subservient to at least
one level of government that covers a wider geographical space
(indeed, otherwise the term “local government law” would be
meaningless). The difference between legal systems manifests itself
in the way each system structures the relationship between the wider
and more powerful level of government—the state—and the smaller
and weaker level—the local. These structures can be placed along a
continuum that consists of roughly six spots, moving from the weakest
form of local empowerment to the strongest.
At the extreme weakness pole of the continuum, the local level
lacks any independent existence. There is “a local”: the local is a
defined geographical space to whose governance specific bodies,
separate from those governing the broader geographical arena, are
assigned. However, those bodies are controlled by the larger level of
government.
In such systems, the local is literally the “creature of the state.”
While this phrase is familiar to any American jurist, we should be

AND URBAN AFFAIRS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: ANALYSES OF TWENTY
WESTERN INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES 603, 605–08 (1991). As the ensuing discussion

will illustrate, even if systems are compared solely on the basis of their functional
empowerment, this binary classification is too simplistic.

144

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

cautious when applying it, since our understating of it is deeply
grounded in the specific dynamics of American local government law.
When used in the United States, the trope conveys the ability of the
greater level of government to create, empower, and abolish the local
level.72 While highlighting the legal fact that the local government
only exists at the pleasure of the state, the phrase takes for granted
the local government’s separate existence—transient and feeble as it
may be. At the same time, the creature of the state metaphor can,
and does, reflect an even weaker form of the local. The local as a
creature of the state might imply a legal reality whereby the local has
never been empowered to meaningfully exist for any period of time.
It is consistently wholly managed, more or less directly, by the state.
Among the bike-share adopting cities that this Article explores,
Mexico City has traditionally stood for this model. American cities
are often rightly perceived as creatures of the state, yet they have
their own governance structure that exercises certain, albeit normally
limited, powers.73 Mexico City does not. The legal entity bearing the
name Mexico City is the Distrito Federal (Federal District).74
Because it is the national capital, it is autonomous from the state
wherein it is located (Estado de México): it is a “federated entity” and
thus often considered Mexico’s thirty-second state. One might expect
Mexico City, as a de-facto separate state, to have a particularly strong
local government. In fact the opposite is true. Until 1996, the city
operated completely in the shadow of the federal government. It was
controlled directly by the Federal President and Congress.75
Although a constitutional amendment passed in 199676 somewhat
ameliorated the situation by establishing a locally elected Head of

72. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179–81 (1907).
73. That was not the case in Washington, D.C. until Congress passed the District
of Columbia Home Rule Act of 1973. See District of Columbia Home Rule Act, D.C.
CODE § 1-201 (2012). Up to that point Washington, D.C. was also an example for
this model of an extreme weak “creature of the state.”
74. “Mexico City" sometimes refers to a narrower geographical space, the historic
city and colonial city center (or Zocalo). In actuality, however, the old city of Mexico
City is a smaller part or “district” of the Distrito Federal (DF) (Federal District) of
the United Mexican States.
75. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended art.
73(VI), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 8 de Octubre de 1974 (Mex.) (granting
the federal Congress the power to legislate on all matters concerning the Federal
District); id. at art. 73(VI)(1) (entrusting the government of the Federal District to
the President of the Republic); id. art. 89(II) (granting the president the power to
appoint and remove freely the governor of the Federal District).
76. At that time a constitutional amendment was adopted. See Constitución
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended art. 73(VI), Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 22 de Agosto de 1996 (Mex.).
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Government (Jefe de gobeirno) and legislative assembly, the city is
still, despite local protests, denied a constitution or charter (unlike all
the other Mexican states) and governed through the federal
constitution and statutes.77 The Mexican President still holds key
powers over the city,78 and the federal Congress maintains legislative
jurisdiction as well as the authority to remove the city’s Head of
Government.79
Even in its contemporary, moderated format, the Mexico City
model represents an extreme notion of local government as creature
of the state. It is a radical model since a local government can be
perceived as created by the state and existing at its mercy, yet still be
afforded certain powers to manage itself. This form of local
empowerment, of which Montreal serves a major example, represents
the next, second, point along the continuum of patterns of city-state
relations. Canadian federal law does not recognize or protect local
governments. The legislative history of the British North America
Act (adopted in 1867, and renamed the Constitution Act in 1982)
indicates that “municipal institutions” were to derive their powers
from the province alone.80 Quebec, like the other provinces,
accordingly chose to view its localities as its creations.81 A clear
expression of this view was provided as late as in 2002, when Quebec
decided to forcibly merge several municipalities in its territory in an

77. Id. art. 122. During the past year, a campaign by city leaders to equalize the
standing of the federal district to that of the other Mexican states and allow it to draw
its constitution, has been gaining steam. Lizbeth Padilla Fajardo, ¿Por qué al DF le
conviene (o no) convertirse en el estado 32? [Why the Federal District should (or
should not) become the thirty-second State], CNNMÉXICO (Jan. 13, 2014),
http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2014/01/13/por-que-al-df-le-conviene-o-noconvertirse-en-el-estado-32. For the official position of the Federal District’s judicial
department, see Flavio Martínez Zavala, Constitucion para el Distrito Federal
[Constitution of the Federal District], CONSEJARIA JURIDICA Y DE SERVICIOS
LEGALES, http://censoeapdf.df.gob.mx/index.php/noticias/noticia/120-constitucion-df
(last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
78. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.] art. 122 (B).
79. Id. art. 122 (A).
80. The Charlottetown Conference of September 1864, where a Canadian Union
was first discussed, agreed that provinces should be responsible for “municipal laws.”
This was changed to “municipal institutions” in the first draft considered by the
ensuing Quebec Conference in October. G.P. BROWNE, DOCUMENTS ON THE
CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA 32–49, 55–165 (2009).
The
Confederation Debates of the Legislature of Canada in 1865 made no reference to
this clause. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE SUBJECT OF THE CONFEDERATION OF
THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES (1865).
81. IAN MACF. ROGERS, THE LAW OF CANADIAN MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 111
(2nd ed. 1971) (explaining that elections in almost all Canadian municipal institutions
are creatures of statute).
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effort to lower taxes. On January 1, 2002, what was then the City of
Montreal was merged with twenty-seven surrounding suburban
municipalities to form a single, unified city covering the entire Island
of Montreal.82
While such action literally exemplifies the fact that the city is a
mere creature of the state—or rather, in Canada, the province—
Quebec has, unlike Mexico, endowed its creature with real legislative
powers. The framework for the powers of cities such as Montreal is
set in the Cities and Towns Act of Quebec, which explains that local
governments do hold powers—those specifically delegated to them by
the provisional government.83 The restriction is simple: powers are
limited to those set out in specific statutes creating or empowering the
local government.
As the provincial court explained:
Our courts have repeatedly stated that cities only possess the
authority granted to them by the provincial government. As a legal
creation, a city only possesses the powers that have been expressly
delegated to it or that result directly from such delegated powers
. . . . A city does not have any inherent power . . . . Therefore, we
must not look for legislation prohibiting a city in engaging in such an
act, but rather we should determine whether there exists a provision
in the provincial legislation authorizing the city to do such a thing.84

The legality of any action of a local government is open to attack
on the ground that it is ultra vires: beyond the powers delegated.85
This approach to local powers is reminiscent of the traditional
attitude known in the United States as Dillon’s Rule.86

82. The merger was accomplished through Bill 170, passed by the Quebec
National Assembly in December 2000. See An Act to Reform the Municipal
Territorial Organization of the Metropolitan Regions of Montréal, Quebec and the
Outaouais, S.Q. 2000, c. 56 (Can.). For more on the merger, see Henry Milner &
Pierre Joncas, Montreal: Getting Through the Megamerger, 11 INROADS 49 (2002).
83. ROGERS, supra note 81, at 136–38.
84. Québec (Procureur général) c. Montréal (Ville) et al., 2004 CarswellQue 1881
(Can.); Ville de Saint-Timothée c. Ville de Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, 2001
CarswellQue 2550 (Can.); R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] S.C.R. 674, 687 (Can.).
85. ROGERS, supra note 81, at 362–64. Even if courts may be willing to expand
the expressly granted powers by interpretation, they will do so only when those
added powers are necessarily implied by the explicit grant of power by the state.
Ottawa Electric Light Co. v. City of Ottawa, [1906] 12 O.L.R. 290 (Can.).
86. JOHN DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
448–55 (5th ed. 1911) (according to Dillon’s Rule a local government only holds those
powers expressly granted to it, and accordingly these are to be construed narrowly).
Like the American Dillon’s Rule, the Canadian ultra vires doctrine as a cap on local
powers is supplemented by the locality’s inability to contradict provincial laws. It is
further strengthened by yet another mechanism, which does not form part of
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An ultra vires, or Dillon’s Rule, model of local empowerment can
be even more restrictive. A local government law system may
supplement the requirement of ex-ante state authorization to act with
an added requirement of specific ex-post approval by the state for
each and every local action in that field.87 This is, at least formally,88 a
component of Israel’s ultra vires model.89 All local legislative,
financing, and planning decisions must be approved by the national
government.90
Even without a state clearance requirement for each decision, the
ultra vires model is on the constraining side of the local
empowerment continuum, as indicated by the many complaints aired

traditional American law. Since the local government is a subordinate form of
government, Canadian law submits its acts to heightened review that normally does
not apply to governmental acts. Local actions may be deemed illegal if they are
enacted for corrupt or personal motives, are made in breach of fundamental
procedural requirements, are discriminatory in operation, or unreasonable. Dale
Gibson, The Constitutional Position of Local Government in Canada, 11 MAN. L.J. 1,
11 (1980).
87. Note the difference between such a regime and the notion of preemption: in
the latter, the local decision stands in the case of state-level inaction, while the former
requires active approval by the state.
88. Yishai Blank has argued persuasively that Israeli local government law in
books is not reflective of Israeli local government law in action, where the central
government is lax and selective in employing its supposedly mandatory powers of
supervision. Yishai Blank, The Location of the Local: Local Government Law,
Decentralization and Territorial Inequality in Israel, 34 Hebrew U. L. Rev. 197
(2004) (Isr.).
89. An early Supreme Court decision announced that Israeli law incorporated the
ultra vires approach to local government. HCJ 36/51 Het v. City of Haifa 5(2) PD
1553, 1557 [1951] (Isr.).
90. Local by-laws must be approved by the Minister of the Interior. Municipalities
Ordinance (New Version), 5724-1964, 1 LSI 247, § 258 (Isr.). Local annual budget
must be submitted to the Minister for approval as well. Id. §§ 204–07. Local zoning
and development plans must receive similar approval. See Planning and Building
Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI 330 (1948–1989) (Isr.). In the field of local taxation, the
allowable rates, exemptions, classification, etc., are set by national legislation or
administrative action. Adjustments in the National Economy Act of 1992, § 9 (Isr.);
Adjustments in the National Economy Act of 1993, § 139 (Isr.). To change the rate
or classification of a property, specific approval is needed. General Property Tax Law
(1990) (Isr.). An amendment passed by the national Parliament, but yet to come into
force, will exempt municipalities that meet certain financial stability criteria from the
approval requirement in certain fields, replacing it with a notification requirement.
The Minister of the Interior must declare that the city meets the financial criteria and
is hence a “sound city hall.” A Law Amending the City Halls Order (No. 135), 2014.
The minister has declared that twenty-four municipalities, including Tel Aviv have
qualified (though qualification can be revoked at any time). Omri Ephraim, They
Don’t have a Deficit: These are the 24 Sound Municipalities, YNET, Mar. 16, 2014
(Isr.).
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by Montreal’s political and economic leadership.91 Their agitation has
gained traction with the recently installed provincial government.92 If
thusly promoted legislation will indeed change the status of big cities
in Quebec, Montreal (along with Quebec City) will move further
along the spectrum of modes of local empowerment.
The next, third, point on this continuum is to be found in the
French model, under which Paris operates. While, like their
Québécois counterparts, French cities (communes) are only
empowered to legislate where the state legislature has allowed them
to do so, the French National Assembly has empowered localities in
advance to generally act in prescribed, yet comprehensive, fields. The
Decentralization Acts of 1982–1983 contain a catalogue of city
functions: school building and maintenance, land use planning, social
assistance, local road maintenance, school busing, waste collection,
and water treatment.93 In each of these, the locality can act without
obtaining prior authorization from the state.94 While this statutory
list of functions appears closed, in actuality cities have been able to
extend their powers into further, discretionary fields.
Often,
following local activity in a new, and formally unauthorized field, the
National Assembly ratifies the practice by adopting a law providing a
legal framework for the preexisting local action.95 The result is that
cities’ powers are as broad—and opaque—as they were under the old

91. Rene Bruemmer, Big-City Mayors Demand More Decision-Making Powers
and Funds from Quebec in New ‘City-State’ Deal, NATIONAL POST, Mar. 20, 2014,
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/03/20/big-city-mayors-demand-more-decisionmaking-powers-and-funds-from-quebec-in-new-city-state-deal/.
92. In April 2014, the newly elected provincial government of Quebec agreed to
sponsor a law that will grant Montreal (as well as Quebec City) a special status
freeing it, in certain fields, from the need to rely on a specific enabling act for every
local action. See Montreal Will Get Special Status from Quebec, CTV MONTREAL
NEWS (Apr. 29, 2014), http://montreal.ctvnews.ca/montreal-will-get-special-statusfrom-quebec-1.1797601. A few years ago, Ontario adopted a law that might serve as
a model for the city of Toronto. See City of Toronto Act, S.O. 2006., c. 11, sch. A
(Can.).
93. See Loi 83-8 du 7 janvier 1983 relative à la répartition de compétences entre
les communes, les départements, les régions et l’Etat [Law 83-8 of January 7, 1983 on
the Division of Powers Between Municipalities, Counties, Regions and the State
Law] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANCÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Jan. 7, 1983 (Fr.).
94. Although, as will be explained later, in some of these fields authority is shared
with regional bodies.
95. For example, the “libertés et responsabilités locales” act was passed on
August 13, 2004 authorizing municipalities to aid businesses. Municipalities had been
providing such aid for decades. See PATRICK LE GALÈS, POLITIQUE URBAINE ET
DÉVELOPPEMENT LOCAL, UNE COMPARAISON FRANCO-BRITANNIQUE (1993).
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system instituted by the 1884 Communal Liberties Act.96 That act put
cities in charge of matters of municipal interest, without clarifying the
actual contents of that term.
This latter manner of empowering cities—granting them control
over “municipal” (or “local”) affairs—is a popular technique that is at
least supposed to empower them more than the methods reviewed so
far. Hence it is the next, and fourth, point on the continuum of local
empowerment schemes. It is prevalent in many American cities,
among them New York City and Chicago, which have been granted
“home rule” status. In American law home rule replaces the
traditional Dillon’s Rule regime mentioned earlier. Under the New
York Constitution’s grant of home rule powers, local governments
may adopt local laws relating to local property, affairs, or
government, as long as they are not inconsistent with the state
constitution or any other general state law.97 Courts read this
provision as conferring a “broad police power upon local government
relating to the welfare of its citizens.”98 Yet it would be a mistake to
assume that the powers exercised by New York City, or any other
home rule city in the state (or country) are truly far-reaching—or
even farther reaching than those of cities like Paris exercising mostly
enumerated powers. Since the New York constitutional provision
limits the city’s alleged general power to actions in “local” affairs in a
manner that is not “inconsistent” with existing general laws or
“preempted” by acts of the legislature, courts have much leeway in
limiting city power.99 So much so that, arguably, in contrast to the
French experience, in New York the opacity of the lines drawn by the
state for the scope of city powers led to further restriction, rather than
expansion, of local powers.100

96. For more on the act, see Gilles Pinson, France, in CHANGING GOVERNMENT
RELATIONS IN EUROPE: FROM LOCALISM TO INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 68, 74
(Michael J. Goldsmith & Edward C. Page eds., 2010).
97. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney
2011). The current home rule provision was raised to constitutional status in the New
York Constitution of 1938. It was first introduced as a statute in 1928. 1928 N.Y.
Laws 1446.
98. N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y. 1987),
aff’d, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
99. E.g., People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1260 (N.Y. 1981) (acknowledging
that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law was, “exclusive and State-wide in scope,
and that, thus, no local government may legislate in this field”).
100. For an overview of the debate over the meaning and reach of home rule in
American law, see, for example, David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 2255 (2003); Richard Briffault, Our Localism, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10–18
(1990); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
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Accordingly, more empowering models that go beyond the
mandate to act in local/municipal affairs (i.e., the home rule model)
can be detected on the empowerment continuum. These further
empowering models, embodying the fifth spot on the local
empowerment continuum identified in this section, bypass the limits
inherent to any model that restricts local powers to a certain realm.
For an illustration, attention should be turned to England.101 Aiming
to revolutionize an exceptionally centralized system,102 the Localism
Act of 2011 states in its opening provision that local authorities hold a
“general power of competence” which implies the “power to do
anything that individuals generally may do.”103 The law does
recognize that restrictions might be placed on this general power,104
but, much more so than the American home rule model, it represents
the opposite attitude to that found in the ultra vires model (of which
Quebec served here as an example).105
Rather than being
empowered to act only when explicitly allowed to do so (by a specific
enabling act as in Quebec or in spheres covered by the home rule
provision, as in New York), the city is empowered to act unless
explicitly barred from doing so.106
The current English regime thus appears dramatically more
empowering than the models reviewed so far. Nonetheless, English

101. London does not operate under the regime described here, but rather under a
special act, the Greater London Authority Act of 1999. Under its original version, in
force at the time the bike share plan was adopted, the Authority held the “general
power” to promote “economic development and wealth creation,” “social
development,” and the “improvement of the environment.” Greater London
Authority Act, 1999, c. 29, § 30(1) (Eng.). The original act contained specific limits
on this power, some of which were later removed by the Localism Act of 2011. See
Localism Act, 2001, c. 20, § 186 (Eng.). The Localism Act further empowered the
Authority. See id. §§ 186–222.
102. David Wilson, The United Kingdom: An Increasing Differentiated Polity?, in
COMPARING LOCAL GOVERNANCE: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 155, 155–57 (Bas
Denters & Lawrence E. Rose eds., 2005).
103. Localism Act, 2011, c. 20, § 1 (Eng.).
104. Id. § 2.
105. England purposefully adopted this new model to reject the older ultra vires
model, from which it has gradually been moving away. The Local Government Act
of 2000 made some headway in providing local authorities with a new, less restrictive,
legal framework. It replaced the ultra vires regime with a regime reminiscent of the
home rule model just reviewed. Local governments were afforded the power to
promote or improve the economic, social, and environmental “well-being of their
area.” Local Government Act, 2000, c. 22, § 2(1) (Eng.).
106. Arguably the Local Government Act goes beyond that. It empowers the
Secretary of State to issue an order amending, repealing, revoking, or disapplying a
statutory provision (whenever passed or made), which prevents or restricts local
authorities from exercising the general power. Id. § 5.
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cities today are not particularly strong, and since this section aims at
constructing a comprehensive view of the modes of city
empowerment, it is important to understand why. The discussion so
far has revolved around the varying extent of cities’ legislative
powers. But these are not the only powers that matter to cities.
English local government law, more than other local government law
systems, represents an extreme disconnect between legislative powers
and the always important finance powers. While English cities’
legislative powers might today, following the Localism Act, be broad,
their funding powers are decidedly narrow. Local governments’
taxing and other revenue-raising powers are harshly restricted,107 and
the new Localism Act specifically excludes the power to engage in
commercial activities—a major source of potential income—from
localities’ “general power” to act as individuals.108 As a result,
London’s government, like other British cities, is forced to depend on
grants from the central government, often with strings attached, for
ninety-five percent of its spending.109 Such total financial dependence
may well offset in practice the far-reaching legislative independence
embedded in the English model of local empowerment.
The model equating municipalities with individuals has its limits,
since any individual may be subject to limits imposed on her by the
state. Hence the model going even farther in empowering a local
government equates cities not with the individual, but with the state.
The sixth and final model in the continuum suggested here, it is the
most radical of the local empowerment models, and occupies the

107. See Localism Act, 2011, c. 20, § 3 (Eng.) (limiting localities’ ability to charge
for services); Id. § 223 (amending the Greater London Authority Act 1999 and
allowing the London mayor to receive through delegation, functions from any
minister, but not any power to fix fees or charges); Local Government Act, 2000, c.
22, § 3(2) (Eng.) (stating that the power conferred under the act “does not enable a
local authority to raise money”). Most generally, the allowable form of local
taxation—currently, the “council tax”—is set by the central government, which also
limits forms of valuation andrate increases, and mandates certain reductions. See
generally, Local Government Finance Act, 1992, c. 14 (Eng.).
108. Localism Act, 2001, c. 20, § 4 (Eng.).
109. Jules Pipe, Two Years On, What Has the Localism Act Achieved?,
Nov.
2,
2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/local-governmentGUARDIAN,
network/2013/nov/02/localism-act-devolution-uk-local-authorities. This predicament
is not unique to England. Mexican municipalities, for example, have traditionally
been faced with a similar problem. Their constitutional standing notwithstanding,
their dependence on federal and state discretionary funding places an obstacle for
any meaningful autonomy. See Jonathan Fox & Luis Hernandez, Mexico’s Difficult
Democracy: Grassroots Movements, NGOs, and Local Government, 17
ALTERNATIVES 165, 169 (1992).
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farthest pole on the empowerment spectrum. Among this Article’s
cities, this model was chosen by Argentina for Buenos Aires.
Argentinian law in general is characterized by a particularly prolocalist approach. Under the laws of the different Argentinian
provinces, municipal competence is quite broad because, in general, it
reaches all matters related to the satisfaction of the local society’s
common welfare needs.110 What renders this model more powerful
than the American home rule model, which some might find similar,
is that in stark contrast to the United States, the Argentinian federal
constitution mandates that provinces create, and respect, municipal
powers.111 Of more interest here, the constitution further specifically
empowers the city of Buenos Aires.112 Declared as the nation’s
capital, the city was separated from the surrounding Buenos Aires
Province. Hence the city’s formal name is Ciudad Autónoma de
Buenos Aires (Autonomous City of Buenos Aires).
For most of its history, the city was run under federal authority—
like Mexico City, which represented, as should be recalled, the most
conscripted model of local empowerment. Buenos Aires was
transported to the opposite pole of the spectrum of local
empowerment by the most recent comprehensive amendment to the
Argentine Constitution, approved in 1994. Therein Buenos Aires was
granted autonomy from the federal government such that it now
operates as a quasi-province, quasi-city.113 Like other Argentine

110. ANTONIO MARÍA HERNANDEZ, SUB-NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
ARGENTINA 52–55 (2001).
111. Article 5 of Argentina’s Constitution, which was included in Argentina’s first
constitution adopted in 1853, provides that “[e]ach Province shall enact its own
constitution under the republican, representative system, in accordance with the
principles, declarations, and guarantees of the National Constitution, ensuring its
administration of justice, municipal regime, and elementary education.” Art. 5,
CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.). Article 123 states that “[e]ach
Province dictates its own Constitution, in conformity with what is established in
Article 5, assuring municipal autonomy and regulating its scope and content in the
institutional, political, administrative, economic and financial structure.” Id. art. 123.
The Mexican Constitution adopts an even more proactive approach, in line with the
weakened standing of the states in its federal system. Constitución Política de los
Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 115 (“For their internal government, the States
shall adopt the popular, representative, republican form of government, with the free
Municipality as the basis of their territorial division and political and administrative
organization.”). Article 115 proceeds to mandate the structure of local governments
and the right to freely administer their finances. Id. The municipal level was
introduced by the first post-revolutionary constitution of 1917.
112. Art. 129, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
113. Id. (“The City of Buenos Aires shall have an autonomous system of
government, with its own legislative and jurisdictional powers, and a head of
government who shall be directly elected by the people of the City. A law shall
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provinces, the city has its own constitution,114 and it holds seats in the
federal House of Representatives and Senate.115 Thus unlike other
cities in Argentina—and all cities operating under the other models of
city power reviewed so far in this section—Buenos Aires enjoys both
the autonomy of a province (or state) in managing its own affairs and
the power to be directly involved in federal affairs.116
This final model illustrates that the spectrum of local
empowerment begins with the city that has no existence independent
of the state, and ends with the city that morphs into a state. To recap
this spectrum in its entirety, there are, roughly speaking, six models of
city-state relationship, proceeding from the most restrictive of the
local to the most liberal: creature of the state, ultra-vires (with or
without a state approval requirement), ex-ante authorization in
specified fields, home rule, all powers not restricted, and city as state.
B.

The Local Government’s Relationship with Other Local
Governments

Local government law creates a system within which cities operate.
That system must regulate the relationship between the local
government and the state government located “above” it. The
preceding section reviewed the different manners employed by
discrete legal systems to structure that relationship. However, that is
not the only inter-governmental relationship a local government law
system must structure. Once a legal system recognizes local
governments—i.e., entities smaller than the overall state system—it is
also pressed to regulate the relationships among those smaller

guarantee the interests of the National Government while the City of Buenos Aires is
the Capital City of the Nation. Within the framework established in this Article, the
National Congress shall convene the inhabitants of the City of Buenos Aires so that
through the representatives that they elect for this purpose, they exact the
organizational statute of the City’s institutions.”); see also Antonio M. Hernandez,
Judicial Federalism and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Argentina, 41
RUTGERS L.J. 907, 907 (2010) (referring to Buenos Aires as a “city-state”).
114. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA CIUDAD AUTÓNOMA DE BUENOS AIRES [Constitution],
Oct. 6, 1996 (Arg.).
115. Arts. 44, 45, 54, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
116. Shanghai’s status in China is also identical to that of a province, since it is a
“municipality directly under the Central Government.” XIANFA art. 95, § 5 (1982)
(China). But Chinese provinces cannot adopt laws conflicting with national laws or
regulations. Id. at art. 100. Hence it might be misleading to treat the system as
particularly empowering.
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entities. Hence in this section, we will review varied patterns that
legal systems adopt for structuring such interactions.117
Different patterns of relationships among local governments may
exist, separately or in tandem, depending on the manner in which the
legal system fragments local powers. First there is the inevitable
fragmentation of space between legally identical local governments,
each governing its own separate space. Further fragmentation might
be added if the system allows multiple local governments, distinct in
their legal status and powers, to cover the same space. If multiple
governments are responsible for the same area, they will differ in
their geographical scope (one government will cover a larger area
encompassing the smaller area covered by the other), in their roles
and powers (one government will hold general powers while the other
will hold specific powers), or in both. Consequently, different local
government law systems will be characterized by three distinct forms
of inter-local interactions: between cities, between cities and
governments of a broader (yet still sub-state) geographical scope
(e.g., regional governments), and between cities and special purpose
governments. This section reviews, in order, the varying contours
jurisdictions might draw for each of these three types of interactions.
By definition, a jurisdiction that allows for local government that is
smaller than the jurisdiction itself creates fragmentation. The first,
and inevitable, form of fragmentation is the splintering of space
between separate yet legally identical local governments—i.e., cities.
The resultant relationship between the various cities, particularly
neighboring cities, is the focus of much economic, political, and legal
discussion among academic commentators, and for good reason.118
This Article does not pretend to truly engage that discussion. For the
Article’s purposes, suffice it to state that in a system where the state
level enjoys the power to legally define the local—as is true in almost
all existing empowerment models reviewed earlier—the state
government sets the rules for this relationship between the different
locals as it defines all other local powers. That is to say, since the state

117. See also Frug, supra note 33, at 298 (arguing that the fragmentation of the
metropolitan area is one of the key issues currently affecting the way in which
government can empower and disempower cities).
118. E.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 3–13 (1999); Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary
Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996); William W. Buzbee,
Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (1999); Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila Foster, The Mobility
Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 63 (2013).
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empowers the city, the state decides which powers to compete or
cooperate with other cities the city can exercise.
This decision dictates the specific pattern the first of the three
forms of inter-local interactions, that between cities, will assume in a
given local government law system. Specifically, it determines to
what extent will that pattern be characterized by coordination. The
architecture of the state-local relationship, especially in systems closer
to the weaker pole of local empowerment continuum, institutes an
asymmetry between the empowerment to engage in inter-local
competition on the one hand, and in inter-local coordination on the
other. Any state grant of a specific power to the city inevitably
contains the ability, maybe even the necessity, to compete with other
cities exercising that same power. In the absence of explicit statecreated curbs on such inter-city competition,119 the power to engage
in it is assumed, or, more accurately, built-into the specific local
power to act.
In contrast, the ability to cooperate and coordinate with other cities
is not a component of the award of specific local powers. Rather, it
must be awarded separately. For inter-city agreements and forums
for coordination to exist, the legal system must adopt a direct
approach towards them.120 Three options present themselves: a legal
system may authorize inter-city agreements and coordination arenas;
it may incentivize the city to enter them; and it may even force them
on the city.
In the United States, most states explicitly authorize local
governments to enter inter-local agreements.121 Once permitted by
the state, such agreements also enable cities to create forums for
broader inter-local cooperation.
Thus, for example, in the
Washington, D.C., area, local governments within the District, in
suburban Maryland, and in northern Virginia entered inter-local
agreements in 1957 to form the Metropolitan Washington Council of

119. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d 713 (1975)
(holding that state statutes impose an obligation on municipalities to zone for the
welfare of all the state’s people, not merely for local residents).
120. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 190 (2001) (discussing inter-local agreements).
121. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE
LAWS GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 26–27
(1993) (reporting that forty two states empower local governments to enter interlocal agreements). For example, the Illinois Constitution provides that “units of local
government . . . may contract or otherwise associate among themselves . . . to obtain
or share services and to exercise, combine, or transfer any power or function, in any
manner not prohibited by law or by ordinance.” ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
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Governments to facilitate cooperation.
Membership of the
association now consists of three hundred elected officials from
twenty-two local governments, the Maryland and Virginia State
legislatures, and Congress.122
A jurisdiction can go beyond such a permissive approach towards
inter-local agreements and cooperation and actively promote it.
Local government law systems can incentivize cooperation by
empowering cities to enact policies in inter-city contracts or bodies
that they are unable to pursue on their own. Since, in such a system,
the city is awarded more authority when acting with others than when
acting alone, it is more likely to initiate, or agree to, cooperation. An
example is found in French law, which enlarges the scope of local
entities’ authority to define priorities in the fields of urban
transportation, commerce, and more, when adopting a joint plan.123
French law also forces the national government to coordinate its
projects with inter-local cooperative bodies—but not with individual
localities.124 Another example is presented by federal American laws
conditioning federal grants for transportation on the formation of
regional planning boards in metropolitan areas.125
Such an incentive-based system goes beyond simply permitting
agreements in an effort to stimulate inter-local cooperation. Still, it is
not particularly aggressive in its pursuit of that goal. The most
proactive approach towards inter-local cooperation between cities a
local government law system may adopt—beyond permission and
incentive—does not leave the decision whether to create these
cooperative bodies to the localities themselves. Rather, the state will
create the forum by law and mandate that the relevant localities
participate. French law has recently done just that: it created a
special regional coordination body for local governments in the Paris

122. METRO. WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, 2013 BOARD MEMBER
HANDBOOK (2013), available at http://www.mwcog.org/uploads/pub-documents/
vF5dWFY20130215152146.pdf.
123. Loi 2000-1208 du 13 décembre 2000 relative à la solidarité et au
renouvellement urbain [Law 2000–1208 of December 13, 2000 on Solidarity and
Urban Renewal], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 14, 2000, p. 19777 (Fr.).
124. Loi 95-115 du 4 février 1995 d’orientation pour l’aménagement et le
développement du territoire [Law 95-115 of February 4, 1995 on Guidance for the
Management and Development of the Territory], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 5, 1995, p.
1973 (Fr.) (addressing voluntary regional arrangements—pays—mostly applicable to
rural areas).
125. 23 U.S.C. § 134 (2012).
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area, the Métropole du Grand Paris, which will start operating in
January 2016.126
When adhering to this latter approach the state imposes some
degree of inter-local coordination; yet still, it does not interfere with
local powers. Actual cooperation is still dependent on choices made
by existing, traditional, local governments. In other words, the
pattern of fragmentation remains based on cities alone: no non-city
body is awarded independent powers. Many jurisdictions, however,
go beyond the typical local governments when dividing spatial
powers, and grant powers to separate, non-city bodies. To deal with
the fragmentation wrought by the presence of disperse neighboring
local governments, they establish autonomous regional bodies
encompassing all of these neighboring governments and governing
the region in its entirety.127 Paradoxically, this cure to fragmentation
adds another layer of governance whose relationship with the
traditional fragmented local governments (i.e., cities) must be
regulated. Jurisdictions must contend with a second form of substate, inter-local, relationships in which the local government is now
engaged (the first being the inter-city relationships just reviewed).
This relationship between the city and the regional body is molded by
many factors, but key among them is the nature of the regional body
of which three types can be identified.
First, in some jurisdictions regional bodies are mere branches of
the state government, in which case the relationship between the city
and the regional body is regulated just as the city-state relationship.
An example of a purely administrative regional body, appointed and
managed by the state government, is the Mexico City Metropolitan
Area: La Zona Metropolitana de la Ciudad de México (ZMCM).
ZMCM covers forty-one municipalities, including the city of Mexico
City—the Distrito Federal—and adjacent localities situated in two
other provinces. It is responsible for planning and delivering major

126. Loi 2014-58 du 27 janvier 2014 de modernisation de l’action publique
territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles [Law 2014-58 of Jan. 27, 2014 on the
Modernization of Public Territorial Action and Affirmation of Cities], JOURNAL
OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
Jan. 28, 2014, p. 1562 (Fr.) (stating that the council will exercise powers transferred to
it by the municipalities, but also powers designated by the state).
127. For more on regionalism, see Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 314 (2000); Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1766–81 (2002).
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inter-jurisdictional services—e.g., highways, airports, and water.128
Regardless, like all of Mexico’s fifty-six metropolitan areas, it is a
mere conduit for implementing federal policies in these fields—it is
part of a local government law system that disempowers all forms of
the local in favor of the state.
Conversely, the regional body may wholly reflect the local, which
appoints its members and controls it. In such a case, the regional
body, awarded new powers by the state, augments the substantive and
geographical sphere of control of the local government. That
characterization of the regional body as empowering the local may be
slightly misleading, however, since often the body strengthens one
local government—normally, though not always, that of the region’s
central city—at the expense of others. Consider the case of regional
bodies in Quebec. Each of the province’s “urban agglomerations”
covers a central city and its surrounding municipalities.129
Agglomeration council seats are distributed among localities in
accordance with population size130 and hence the central city is
assured dominance.131 Montreal holds eighty-seven percent of the
votes in the urban agglomeration of which it, along with fifteen other
municipalities, forms a part. The city of Montreal literally holds these
votes: the law mandates that the municipal representatives vote in
accordance with the decision of the city council that dispatched them
to the agglomeration council.132 The city of Montreal is thereby
empowered vis-à-vis its surroundings since the law specifically bans
surrounding municipalities from acting in fields that are deemed
concerning the entire region,133 including transportation, water,
police, social services, and development.134
In its first two forms, the regional body embodies either the state
(e.g., ZMCM) or the city (e.g., the Montreal urban agglomeration).
Another, third form of regional body that a local government law

128. Bruce J. Perlman & Juan de Dios Pineda Guadarrama, Rethinking a
Megalopolis: A Metropolitan Government Proposal for the Mexico City Metro Area,
43 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 144, 145–46 (2011).
129. An Act Respecting the Exercise Of Certain Municipal Powers in Certain
Urban Agglomerations, C.Q.L.R., c. E-20.001, §§ 4–15 (2004) (Can.).
130. Id. § 59.
131. Unsurprisingly, the suburbs are resentful of this arrangement. See, e.g., Jason
Magder, Suburban Mayors Hope for Changes to Agglomeration Council, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 2013, http://www.montrealgazette.com/business/Suburban+
mayors+hope+changes+agglomeration+council/9129015/story.html.
132. C.Q.L.R., c. E-20.001, § 62.
133. Id. § 17.
134. Id. § 19.
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system may empower reflects a truly autonomous third tier of
government between the city and the state. Political regional
bodies135 exercise specific powers that are reserved to them. They
may thus place an additional constraint on city powers, separate from
that imposed by the state. An illustration is the French region.136
Following decentralization reforms in the 1980s,137 the region, for
instance, Île-de-France covering Paris,138 is a directly elected
governmental body that exercises enumerated regional-level powers.
For example, while the commune (city) operates elementary schools,
the region operates the high schools. 139 While the commune is
responsible for local planning, the region is responsible for regional
planning.140
All the regional bodies reviewed so far—whether run by the state,
by the localities, or independently—exercise general, or, more
accurately, varied, powers. Another wholly separate class of sub-state
governments (often, though not always, regional in character) is
different. Local government law systems may recognize bodies that
hold the competence to merely act in one, or a few, specified field or
fields. Supplementing the relationship among cities reviewed first in
this section, and the relationship between cities and regional bodies,
reviewed second, the relationship between the city and these bodies is

135. Mexican law explicitly prohibits such bodies. Constitución Política de los
Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 115(i) (stating that each municipality shall be
administered by a council (Ayuntamiento), elected by direct popular vote, and that
there shall be no intermediate authority between this body and the government of
the State).
136. At least theoretically, in many American states the county is also an example.
See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV.
931, 979–92 (2010) (discussing the current limits and potential promise of counties as
regional bodies).
137. The regions were created in 1956 but were originally staffed with state
bureaucrats. ANDY SMITH & PAUL HEYWOOD, REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE
AND SPAIN 6 (2000).
138. Generally France operates a three-tiered local government system: region,
département, commune. Paris is an exception since it is both a commune and a
département.
139. See MINISTRY OF NAT’L EDUC., FILES ON SCHOOL EDUCATION: SCHOOL
EDUCATION IN FRANCE 4 (2012), available at cache.media.eduscol. education.fr/file/
dossiers/07/3/2013_School_Education_in_France_244073.pdf
(explaining
school
divisions).
140. The region adopts a “Schéma Régional d’Aménagement et de
Développement du Territoire.” Loi 83-8 du 7 janvier 1983 relative à la répartition des
compétences entre les communes, les départements, les régions et l’Etat [Law 83-8 of
January 7, 1983 on the division of powers between municipalities, departments,
regions, and the state], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 9, 1983, art. 34.
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the third and final form of sub-state relationships a local government
law system may define and regulate.
This relationship is usually designed to weaken the city. American
law, for example, has endeavored over the past century and a half to
limit the power of cities by reinforcing that of special districts and
authorities.141 Each such entity is granted the responsibility for a
limited number of functions: for example, water supply or public
housing. Such special districts are most often created by the state
through statute: e.g., New York’s Metropolitan Transportation
Authority Act,142 or Chicago’s Regional Transportation Authority
Act.143 Once created, the special district drains powers that could
have otherwise been exercised by the city. This tension is somewhat
alleviated when the cities covered by the district must assent to its
creation and are then asked to appoint some of its board members
(e.g., Chicago’s Regional Transportation Authority).144 However,
often the authority is not controlled by the city, but rather by the state
(e.g., New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority, whose
members are appointed by the governor).145
In sum, cities may interact with sub-state actors of three sorts. For
each, a different potential pattern of relationship may exist in
different local government law systems. First, all cities interact with
other cities, and the state may allow them to cooperate with those
other cities, incentivize them to do so, or force such cooperation on

141. See Nadav Shoked, Quasi-Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971, 1977–90 (2013).
142. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1260–1279 (McKinney 1967).
143. 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3615/1.01 (1991).
144. Id. (established by statute but subject to approval in referendum); Id. § 3.01
(stating that the mayor of Chicago appoints five members, and that other members
are appointed by Cook County and surrounding counties).
145. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1263 (McKinney 2010) (stating that members are
appointed by the governor following approval of the Senate, and that some must be
appointed based on the recommendation of the city). Alternatively, state statues
may create a special authority that is run by the general regional body (e.g., Paris’s
Syndicat des transports d’Île-de-France (STIF)) and in such cases the analysis may
revert to that reviewed earlier when regional bodies were considered. Ordonnance
59-151 du 7 janvier 1959 relative à l’organisation des transports de voyageurs en Ile
de france [Ordinance 59-151 of January 7, 1959 on the Organization of Passenger
Transport in the Ile-de-France], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 10, 1959, p. 696 (Fr.). Originally, STIF
was governed by the state, but following a decentralization reform in 2005 the state
withdrew and transferred control to the region. Loi 2004-809 du 13 août 2004 relative
aux libertés et responsabilités locales [Law 2004-809 of August 13, 2004 on Local
Freedoms and Responsibilities], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 17, 2004, p. 14545 (Fr.). In Montréal
the agglomeration council appoints the board. In such case the analysis reverts to
that reviewed earlier when regional bodies were considered.
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them. Second, in some local government law systems cities also
interact with regional bodies, which may be agents of the state further
facilitating state dominance over the city, agents of the cities
themselves empowering some cities at the expense of others, or
independent bodies removing certain powers from the purview of the
city. Third, local government law systems may force cities to deal
with special purpose governments, which remove control over specific
policy fields from the city, but in whose management the state may
permit the city to participate.
C.

The Local Government’s Relationship with Entities Located
Below It

Once a legal system recognizes the local—a sub-state level of
governance—it must regulate the relationship between that level and
the state level, as well as the relationships within that level.
Accordingly, so far this Part of the Article reviewed the different
ways in which jurisdictions may regulate the relationship between the
city and legal entities that are either “above” it (the state, regional
bodies) or on the same plane with it (neighboring municipalities).
There may be yet another group of relationships affecting a city’s
power to adopt a policy. For the legal structure might also empower
entities located below the local, i.e., below the city. While a local
government law system must, by definition, have a local level and a
state level, it need not recognize any level below the local. Yet often
it does.146 For if the local is created and empowered in the name of
decentralization, why stop there? Why settle on the local, the city, as
the lowest level of government?
An expanding number of legal systems have grown frustrated with
their failure to provide a satisfactory, principled answer to these
questions, and thus have embarked on a drive to create and empower
even smaller entities that supposedly more closely correspond to
ideas of community. Elsewhere, one of the authors titled this
phenomenon micro-localism.147
Micro-localism may entail the
establishment, recognition, and empowerment of bodies or groups
located below the city. When present in a local government law
system, such micro-localism differs in its degree of formality and of
directness. The following paragraphs will expound on these two
variables, moving from the most direct and formal manifestations of
micro-localism to the least.

146. Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1401–02 (2014).
147. See id.
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Micro-localism may affect city policy-making by direct creation of
formal entities—termed by Richard Briffault as sub-local bodies148—
holding specific powers. Examples are Paris’s and Montreal’s
statutorily created arrondissements—each with its own mayor and
council,149 or Buenos Aires’s elected communas, created by the city
legislature and granted not only a participatory role in the supply of
services and social benefits but also, for example, the exclusive power
to plan and control the maintenance of parks and streets.150
Such formal sub-local bodies are strongest when instituted at the
same time the city government itself was founded, rather than as a
later decentralization reform. Thus London’s boroughs, which set
their own form of elected government and whose powers respecting
local services and policies are broader than those of the Greater
London Authority (e.g., they include education), were created along
with the Authority, and most of them trace their boundaries to preexisting independent local governments.151 Another example is the
sixteen districts and one county constituting the municipality of
Shanghai, which were recognized alongside with Shanghai in the
Chinese national constitution, and elect their own “people’s
congresses.”152 Although the standing committee of Shanghai can
annul any of their decisions,153 theoretically their powers within their
own micro-local domains are identical to those of the broader
municipality.154 More strikingly, these micro-local legislatures elect
the members of Shanghai’s people’s congress.155
Thus the legal systems in Shanghai, London, Paris, Montreal, and
Buenos Aires recognize and, to different degrees, empower formal
148. Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82
MINN. L. REV. 503, 508 (1997).
149. See CODE GENERAL DES COLLECTIVITÉS TERRITORIALES [C.G.C.T] Partie II
[Part II], Livre I, V [Books I, V] (Fr.). The law, adopted in 1982, gives the
arrondissement the power to manage local social services, opine on any zoning issue
in the district, and more. Id. Unlike in France, this Quebec law left it to the city to
organize the actual arrondissements. Unlike its Paris counterparts, the Montreal
arrondissement also adopts its own budgets. See generally, An Act Respecting
Municipal Territorial Organization, C.Q.L.R., c. O-9 (Can.).
150. Law No. 1777, Apr. 10, 2005, [1518-005] B.O. 2292 (Arg.).
151. The London Boroughs and the Greater London Council were created by the
London Government Act of 1963. London Government Act, 1963, c. 33 (Eng.).
Under the Government and Public Involvement in Health Act of 2007, each borough
council and its residents must choose one of two possible models for its political
structure. Government and Public Involvement in Health Act, 2007, c. 28 (Eng.).
152. XIANFA art. 95 (1982) (China).
153. Id. art. 104.
154. Id. art. 99.
155. Id. arts. 97, 102.
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micro-local bodies of a political nature. Other legal systems
establishing formal micro-local bodies may accord them a muchlessened role. Each of Mexico City’s delegaciones has been headed,
for the last fourteen years, by an elected chair (jefe delegacional), yet
they all lack any legislative or regulatory powers, and are solely
administrative sub-divisions of the city implementing its policies.156
New York City’s formal micro-local bodies, the “community boards,”
are solely advisory and composed of members appointed by city-level
representatives.157
The micro-local bodies in the systems reviewed so far varied in
their potency in the local decision-making process—those reviewed
first held assigned powers; those reviewed second, only administrative
or advisory powers—but they were all formally recognized. A local
government law system may also settle for completely informal
micro-local bodies: bodies created not by the city or the state, but by
voluntary action of local residents.
Examples are Chicago’s
neighborhood associations and commerce boards.158 While not
legally obliged to do so, the local government might be pressed to
devise a strategy to acknowledge the role and influence of these
informal micro-local bodies. For example, in Chicago, aldermen, who
customarily enjoy the right to veto city council decisions affecting
their ward, often consult neighborhood associations and boards
within their wards before announcing their position. Some aldermen
have, at times, even pledged to abide by the neighborhood
association’s stance.159
156. Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública del Distrito Federal [LOAPDF]
[Enabling Law for Public Administration of the Federal District], art. 2, Gaceta
Oficial del Distrito Federación [GODF], 29 de Diciembre de 1998 (Mex.) (defining
the delegaciones as political-administrative bodies enjoying “functional” autonomy);
see also id. arts. 3 (III.), 22(XX), 24(III), 37.
157. See N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 70 (2009). Board members are appointed by the
Borough President and city councilpersons. Id. They mostly convey local concerns to
the city, but they also play an advisory role in zoning issues and must be consulted on
the placement of most municipal facilities in the community. Id.
158. One example of a powerful neighborhood association in Chicago is the East
Village Association, with whom officials consult before approving zoning changes or
About
EVA,
E.
VILLAGE
ASS’N,
licensing
in
the
area.
http://news.eastvillagechicago.org/p/about-eva.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). An
example of a neighborhood-based chamber of commerce, operating in a neighboring
community within West Town, is the Wicker Park Bucktown Chamber. About the
Wicker
Park
Bucktown
Chamber,
WICKER
PARK
BUCKTOWN,
http://www.wickerparkbucktown.com/the-chamber/about (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
159. For example, one alderman pledged to a neighborhood association within his
ward (the East Village Association) not to award a liquor license in the area for two
years unless the association released him from said pledge. Emily Morris, Forbidden
Root Brewery Plan Gets Vote of Support from Neighborhood Group, DNAINFO
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Finally, in addition to formal or informal micro-local bodies, the
local government might be forced to interact with a micro-local that is
instituted indirectly. Like the voluntary neighborhood association,
such micro-localities lack a formal role in decision-making processes;
in addition, unlike the neighborhood association, they lack an
institutional embodiment altogether. One form of such extremely
informal, indirect micro-local influence is found in England, where
the Localism Act of 2011 empowered groups of residents to oblige a
local government to thoroughly consider their offer to replace it in
the provision of any public service (“the right to challenge”).160
Another form of such informal empowerment, arguably even more
indirect, is found in New York and elsewhere in the United States
where state laws have been interpreted to grant individual residents
standing to legally contest a city decision affecting their
neighborhood.161 When viable under the jurisdiction’s procedural
and substantive laws, the threat of this radical form of indirect
empowerment of the sub-city neighborhood means that, even in
systems where micro-local bodies are wholly absent, the city is not
immune to challenges from lower-level actors.
Local government systems are not obliged to recognize decisionmaking powers located underneath the city. Nevertheless, in many
local government law systems cities are forced to contend with their
constituent elements. These may express their preferences through
means situated at different spots along a spectrum of formal
establishment and direct empowerment: formal neighborhood bodies
with defined political powers, formal neighborhood bodies with
advisory or administrative powers alone, informal neighborhood
bodies, or individual or group legal standing to sue the city on behalf
of neighborhood interests.
D. Relationships Within the Local Government
This Part of the Article has discussed the “city’s” power to adopt
policies and its need to coordinate such moves with other entities—
located above it, on the same plane with it, or below it. A casual
reader of this, or any other such discussion of “city” power, may infer
that the city is a unitary “black box”: one entity with external
relationships, but no real internal processes. Obviously that is not the

CHI., May 6, 2014, www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140506/east-village/forbidden-rootbrewery-plan-gets-vote-of-support-from-neighborhood-group.
160. Localism Act, 2011, c. 20, §§ 81–86 (Eng.).
161. See Shoked, supra note 146.
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case. The “city” does not adopt policies; its political branches adopt
policies. The way in which they do so inevitably affects those policies.
Thus the final variable setting local government law systems apart,
which is reviewed here, focuses on the city’s internal interactions.
Specifically, this section examines the relationship, or separation of
powers, between the city legislature and city executive.
Cities are often designed along institutional lines familiar from the
context of state-level governments. Their political decision-making
powers are normally distributed between a legislative branch—a city
council—and an executive branch—a mayor.162 Exceptions do
exist:163 the Greater London Authority’s assembly lacks the power to
pass legislation and is thus solely a supervisory body overlooking an
executive, the mayor.164 Still, more often than not, cities have
legislative and executive branches, and differ mostly in the balance
they strike between these two powers.
Legislatures’ most powerful tool is normally their control of the
budget. Many local government law systems emulate state level
governments in this regard. The city council must approve the annual
budget proposed by the mayor.165 However, sometimes the council’s
power in this regard is restrained. In London, for example, the
Assembly can only reject the budget by a two-thirds majority, and its
power to amend the budget is limited.166
While their control over the budget empowers city councils,
mayors, for their part, are strengthened through their control of the
city’s administrative branches. Administrative regulation may often
effectively replace legislation, and thus spare the mayor the need to
have the council legislate the policies she desires.167 The mayor is
162. While mostly irrelevant for the purposes of this Article, cities, like states, may
also have a third branch of government: a judicial system that adjudicates cases
involving legislation adopted by the local legislature.
163. In the United States, many cities follow the council-manager form of
government, rather than a mayor model. E.g., Harold Wolman, Local Government
Institutions and Democratic Governance, in THEORIES OF URBAN POLITICS 135, 138–
39 (David Judge et al. eds., 1995).
164. Parliament recently released a highly critical review of this anomalous
structure. CMTYS. & LOCAL GOV’T COMM., POST-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY OF THE
GREATER LONDON AUTHORITY ACT 2007 AND THE LONDON ASSEMBLY, 2013-14,
H.C. 213, at 30–32 (U.K.). But note that the London mayor is also at best a weak
executive, as he does not control the boroughs.
165. E.g., Municipalities Ordinance (New Version), 5724-1964, 1 LSI 247, §§ 204–
07 (Isr.) (requiring city council approval for the local budget prepared by the mayor).
166. Greater London Authority Act, 1999, c. 29, sch. 6 (Eng.).
167. The issue was recently litigated in New York, where the court held that the
mayor could not bypass the council and enact a ban on large sugary drinks through
administrative action of the Board of Health. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic
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hence particularly powerful in a system where she alone controls the
executive. In a system where administrative officers are accountable
solely to the mayor, the council may be left with only the power of the
budget to meaningfully impact policy in key fields. That is the case in
New York City and Buenos Aires, where the department heads or
ministeros/as are appointed and removed by the mayor, and the
council must content itself with supervising them through control of
their budgets.168 The mayor is weaker in other cities, such as Chicago,
which require that the council approve the appointment of at least
some of the commissioners heading the city’s executive departments,
and allow it to remove them.169 Finally, the mayor is least powerful in
cities where she is required to form an executive cabinet, or coalition,
that must enjoy majority backing among the council members.170 This
is the system instituted by Israeli law and governing the relationship
between Tel Aviv’s council and the city hall board.171 It also
characterizes Chinese law governing the relationship between
Shanghai’s people’s congress and its standing committee172 (but actual

Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d
681, 697–701 (2014).
168. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 6 (2009) (“The mayor shall appoint the heads of
administrations, departments, all commissioners and all other officers not elected by
the people, except as otherwise provided by law. The mayor . . . may remove from
office any public officer holding office by appointment from a mayor of the
city . . . .”); Art. 100, CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA CIUDAD AUTÓNOMA DE BUENOS AIRES
[CONST. B.A.] (Arg.).
169. E.g., CHI. MUNI. CODE § 2-45-030 (2014) (Commissioner of planning and
development); CHI. MUNI. CODE § 2-102-020 (2014) (Commissioner of
transportation); CHI. MUNI. CODE § 2-84-040 (2014) (Superintendent of police). In
London, the Assembly holds confirmation hearings on several mayoral appointees
(including the chair of Transport for London), but the Mayor can overrule any
rejection. Greater London Authority Act, 2007, c. 24, § 4 (Eng.). The one exception
is the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, whose appointment can be rejected by a
two-thirds majority of the Assembly’s Police and Crime Committee, thanks to a
special law. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011, c. 13, § 20(3)(b)
(Eng.).
170. Paradoxically, a council is probably the weakest when the mayor may appoint
its members to the executive, but need not enjoy the continued support of council
members. In this scenario, a person is often institutionally expected to supervise
herself: the same person may be a councilperson and a member of the executive.
Reforms have been promoted to alter the current scheme of the Greater London
Assembly, which allows for such appointments. CMTYS. & LOCAL GOV’T COMM.,
supra note 157, at 24–29.
171. See Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Dep’t of Charters & Neighborhoods, City Halls Order
(New Edition) (Isr.). The current coalition agreements among the different parties
represented in the Tel Aviv city council are available at http://www.tel-aviv.gov.il/
Cityhall/Divisions/Pages/Neighborhoods.aspx?tm=&sm=&side=256.
172. XIANFA art. 103 (1982) (China).
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executive powers lie with the parallel “local people’s government”
and mayor, both appointed by the central government).173
The mayor’s ability to adopt policies is thus dictated by the
institutional design of her powers vis-à-vis those of the legislature in
controlling the budget and the executive branch. Her relative
standing is also molded by less apparent factors. A mayor is rendered
powerful when she can draw on her standing in other, wider political
forums. In many American states, the mayor controls appointments
to special purpose governments.174 French law allows, and in practice
heavily relies on, the principle of comul de mandats—accumulation of
offices. Mayors hold one or more elective mandates on upper levels,
including the National Assembly, in addition to their mayoral
position.175 Bearing additional offices naturally augments the political
clout of mayors, often dubbed notables locaux (“the local worthies”).
Some even proceed to declare French local governments “local
monarchies.”176 Even without the formal trappings of higher office, a
mayor, especially when serving in a major city, can be emboldened by
her standing in national politics. Council members are highly unlikely
to enjoy any such visibility.177
At the same time, while the mayor may be empowered thanks to
her standing in arenas located above the local government,
173. Id. art. 105.
174. Chicago’s mayor, for example, appoints all members of the Chicago Board of
Education. The statute explicitly states that council approval is not necessary. 105
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-3 (2005).
175. The only limits on the ability to accumulate office are found in la loi
organique 2000-294 du 5 avril 2000 relative aux incompatibilités entre mandats
électoraux [Organic Law 2000-294 of April 5, 2000 on Incompatibilities between
Electoral Mandates], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 6, 2000 (dealing with members of the National
Assmebly), and la loi 2000-295 du 5 avril 2000 relative à la limitation du cumul des
mandats électoraux et des fonctions électives et à leurs conditions d'exercice [Law
2000-295 of Apr. 5, 2000 of the Restriction of Accumulated Electoral Mandates and
Elective Offices and their Conditions of Practice], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 6 (dealing
with members of the European Parliament, local elected officials, and local
executives).
176. See Albert Mabileau, Les genies invisibles du local. Faux-semblants et
dynamiques de la décentralisation [Invisible Local Genies. Pretenses and Dynamics
of Decentralization], 47 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE [FRENCH
POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW] 340, 353 (1997)(Fr.); Yres Mény, La République des
fiefs [The Republic of Fiefs], 60 POUVOIRS [POWERS] 17 (1992) (Fr.).
177. See Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the
Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 256976 (2006)
(arguing that local institutional reforms are not enough to strengthen American
mayors; it is important that avenues be opened for mayors to participate in state and
federal politics).
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councilmembers may augment their status thanks to their standing in
arenas located below it. When each council member is elected to
represent a specific district within the city, she may enjoy great
influence on all decisions affecting that district, due to her ability to
furnish, when and to whom necessary, local votes.
For the internal decision-making processes of the city, a
determinative factor is often the balance of powers between the
mayor and the council. This balance is shaped mostly by three
factors. The first two are dictated by institutional design: the extent
of the council’s power to control the budget, and the extent of the
mayor’s power to control administrative authorities. The third
variable is both actors’ relative political power, which is often
determined by the the relevant local actor’s standing in other forums.
E.

Summary

As the sources of power reinforcing the institutional standing of
the local executive or legislature—from above or from below—just
analyzed highlight, the four different axes that mold cities’ powers
should not be viewed as independent from each other. This Part
thoroughly reviewed four defining features of a local government law
system: The basis for the local government’s authority in state law
(placed on a continuum from the weakest to the strongest); the
manner in which sub-state power is fragmented among different local
governments (setting infrastructure for cooperation among cities and
establishing regional bodies and special purpose governments); the
willingness to recognize the power of entities smaller than the local
(in differing degrees of formality and directness); and the internal
power structure within city government (setting the relative power of
the mayor in her interactions with the council). Each of these four
key elements of a local government law system makes certain local
policies, but not others, possible. However, these four axes of
difference do not exist in a vacuum: they interact with each other.
Their joint operation establishes the foundation for any local
government law system.
III. BIKE SHARE PLANS IMPLEMENTED BY DIVERSE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW SYSTEMS
Local government law systems differ in many ways. Some of the
most salient differences were detected in the preceding Part, and
organized into four particularly impactful axes. Yet how do these
differences matter with respect to actual policy? How does a local
government legal regime affect real world action? How does
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comparative local government law in books translate into
comparative local government law in action?178
Answering these quandaries is a central task of this Article, which
this Part engages. It goes back to the bike share plans—introduced in
Part I—and examines the way in which the legal regimes of major
cities—reviewed in Part II—impacted their adoption and form.
Three elements of a bike share plan that are, almost undeniably, key
for its operation will be discussed: the fashion of the plan’s adoption,
the plan’s funding, and the locations picked for the plan’s stations.
The analysis of these three components demonstrates that while the
role and definition of a bike share plan is straight-forward, and the
overall mode of operation of plans adopted following Paris’s Vélib’ is
similar in its outline—as seen in Part I—the plans differ greatly in
some of their most important details, and these differences are
attributable to variations in local government law regimes.
A. Adoption of the Bike Share Plan
The importance of the mode of a plan’s adoption needs no
accounting for. The first task in promoting a policy—a local policy or
any other policy—is to identify the actor who may legally enact it.
The specific identity of that actor affects not only the likelihood of the
policy’s eventual adoption, but also the characteristics of the policy
once in force. The ability to integrate the policy with other existing
policies and to adjust rules that may facilitate or hamper its success
hinges on the adopting actor’s power to control these other policies
and rules.
While all the cities under consideration adopted a bike share plan,
they vary widely in the identity of the authority that was responsible
for that move. This variation is a function of the four types of
differences between local government law regimes detected in Part II.
This section reviews in order the effect each of the four axes has had
on plans’ adoption.
First, the specific location of the local government law regime on
the empowerment continuum identified in Part II.A prescribed the
expanse of the legal authority to adopt and implement a plan. In the
city that is fully the creature of the state, Mexico City, the bike share
plan was a policy authorized by the federal government.179

178. See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L.
REV. 12 (1910).
179. The plan was implemented by the Federal District’s Ministry of the
Environment. See SECRETARÍA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE, supra note 64, at 26–41.
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Elsewhere, where cities enjoy some legal independence, challenges
still presented themselves. In cities operating under the slightly less
weakening regime of ultra-vires (or Dillon’s Rule) city governments
could not simply assume the authority to enact the program. Tel Aviv
sought and received approval from the national Minister of the
Interior.180 In Montreal, there were doubts whether the city enjoyed
the power to adopt the plan in the absence of a specific provincial
enabling act. The city proceeded to adopt the Bixi plan, nonetheless,
relying on its authorization to act in the field of local transportation
and to manage its public property.181 The City’s Auditor General,
when asked to review the move, agreed that those provisions
provided the necessary authority, but only as long as the bike share
service was not offered for commercial purposes.182 Thus the city was
barred, for example, from directly exporting the system to other cities
and countries.183
Cities located closer than Tel Aviv and Montreal to the
empowerment pole on the city-state relationship continuum did not
have to contend with questions respecting the local authorization to
adopt the plan. Such cities’ relative freedom to adopt bike share
plans regardless of their general patterns of empowerment can
probably be written off as owing to the low stakes involved in these
policies, at least in relative terms.184 However, even when cities were
empowered to adopt bike share plans, secondary or incidental
authority problems sometimes appeared. One recurring example has
been road safety rules requiring bicycle riders to wear helmets.185

180. Tel Aviv Finance Committee, Decision 303, Protocols No. 17/10, at 11 (Jan.
25, 2010) (Isr.).
181. Montreal Exec. Comm. Res. CE07 1555 (Can. 2007).
182. BUREAU DU VÉRIFICATEUR GÉNÉRAL, SPECIAL REPORT OF THE AUDITOR
GENERAL OF THE VILLE DE MONTRÉAL TO THE CITY COUNCIL AND TO THE URBAN
AGGLOMERATION COUNCIL 67, 76–77 (2010).
183. Id. at 80–81.
184. For example, Tel Aviv encountered little trouble in having its plan approved
by the Minister of the Interior. As scholars have noted, local by-laws are rejected by
the Israeli Minister of the Interior, who exercises the legal duty to approve them, only
when they touch upon “sensitive political matters”—mostly issues relating to
religious affairs, such as the sale of non-Kosher meat or the opening of businesses on
the Sabbath. Blank, supra note 88, at 262.
185. A recently released study found that with the adoption of a bike share plan,
head injuries’ portion of the overall number of bike riding related injuries rises.
Janessa M. Graves et al., Public Bicycle Share Programs and Head Injuries, AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH Aug. 2014, at e106. However, since the research also found that the
overall number of injuries decreases in cities with bike share plans, the hastily made
popular argument that bike share plans are related to higher rates of head injuries is
misleading.
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Such a requirement renders bike shares impractical,186 and it has been
cited as the cause for the low ridership afflicting the Melbourne plan
and its ensuing failure.187 Thus, operators and cities seek to prevent
helmet rules from being applied.188 Exemptions from the helmet rule
are easily enacted when the authority implementing the plan also
controls safety rules—as was the case with the federal government in
Mexico City.189 However, for cities whose mode of empowerment
includes the power to adopt a bike share plan but not to enact road
safety rules, the challenge presented is very real. Vancouver’s efforts
to adopt a bike-share plan have been thwarted for years by British
Columbia’s laws requiring all cyclists to wear helmets.190 Boston was
forced to introduce the first helmet dispensary since Massachusetts
law mandates that “[a] person, firm or corporation engaged in the
business of renting bicycles shall make available a bicycle
helmet . . . to each person renting a bicycle.”191 In Tel Aviv, the

186. See Piet de Jong, The Health Impact of Mandatory Bicycle Helmet Laws,
RISK ANALYSIS 782, 785 (2012). A feasibility study of a bike share plan in the city of
Seattle, conducted by the University of Washington, highlighted this problem. See
DEP’T OF URBAN DESIGN & PLANNING, UNIV. OF WASH., SEATTLE BICYCLE SHARE
FEASIBILITY STUDY (2011).
187. Benjamin Preiss, Bike Share Scheme Disappointing, AGE (May 31, 2011),
http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/bike-share-scheme-disappointing-201105311fdto.html. The relevant bike helmet law is a state law adopted by Victoria. See
Tristin Hopper, Frustrated by B.C. safety laws, Vancouver prepares to roll out
helmet vending machines at bike-share stations, NAT’L POST, July 25, 2013,
http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/07/25/vancouver-to-launch-helmet-vendingmachines-along-with-new-bike-share-system-to-ensure-citys-riders-are-protected. In
late 2014 Seattle became the first city to run a bike share plan allowing each renter to
also rent a helmet (for $2). Seattle was forced to do so since it operated in King
County, which has a mandatory helmet law. For information on Seattle’s system,
Pronto!, see How it Works, PRONTO!, http://www.prontocycleshare.com/how-itworks.
188. The operator of Capital Bikeshare in D.C. was successful in making the
argument that adhering to the rule would require it to violate the district’s hygiene
rules due to the need to share helmets. See INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra
note 49, at 79.
189. The helmet law was repealed for reasons of social equity, on the ground that
not everyone could afford a helmet and disposable helmets were an environmental
hazard. Ana Peñalosa, Bike-Sharing Goes Viral: Mexico City, Mexico, SUSTAINABLE
TRANSPORT MAG., Winter 2009, at 29. In June 2014, Dallas eliminated its
requirement that adult bikers wear helmets in order to jump start its bike share plan
planned for later in the year. See Dallas Eliminates Helmet Rule for Adult Bike
Riders, DALLAS NEWS (June 11, 2014), http://www.myfoxdfw.com/story/25754861/
dallas-eliminates-helmet-rule-for-adult-bike-riders.
190. Jon Marcus, One City Finally Solved Bike Sharing’s Big Safety Problem,
TIME, Nov. 14, 2013, available at http://nation.time.com/2013/11/14/one-city-finallysolved-bike-sharings-big-safety-problem/.
191. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 85, § 11D (2009).
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mayor implored council members to pressure members of the
national parliament to change the relevant safety rules.192 Only after
parliament obliged and adjusted the Israeli helmet statute did the
city’s plan become viable.193
By determining whether state permission is a condition for the
plan’s adoption or for regulatory adjustments necessary for its
viability, the patterns of local empowerment clearly affect the manner
by which different cities introduce a bike-share plan. The other three
legal axes along which jurisdictions vary can also carry a major effect.
Patterns of local fragmentation, the second axis surveyed in Part II.B,
were responsible for the fact that some of the bike share plans were
not adopted, or implemented, by traditional city governments.
Rather, the leading role was sometimes assumed by local bodies
falling into one of the other categories introduced in Part II.B.
In Washington, D.C., the plan was adopted as an inter-local
contract facilitated by an inter-local coordinating body. Capital
Bikeshare began when the District’s Department of Transportation
and Arlington County, Virginia, expressed their mutual desire for a
bike-share.
The two local governments reviewed bike share
proposals, and then selected an operator in 2010.194 A few years later,
other local governments—Alexandria, Virginia, and then
Montgomery County, Maryland—chose to join Capital Bikeshare.195
Actual implementation of the plan, and the securing of funding, was
carried out through the National Capital Region Transportation
Planning Board,196 a subdivision of the Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments, the area’s inter-local coordinating body,
discussed in Part II.B.

192. Minutes of City of Tel Aviv Council meeting, at 56 (Nov. 1, 2010). On August
3, 2011, Parliament exempted from its helmet law adult riders in urban roads.
Transportation Order, § 65C(a) (Isr.). Even before that, the law was not enforced,
since no regulations to implement it were adopted by the ministry. Sahar Hazkoren,
Rochvim Al Ophanaim? Kvar Lo Tzarich Casdah Ba’yir [Riding a Bicycle? No
Longer Need a Helmet in the City], YNET (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.ynet.co.il/
articles/0,7340,L-4104316,00.html (Isr.).
193. Since the original contract with the operator was signed before the national
law was amended, the city promised to indemnify the operator for any judgment in a
lawsuit brought as a result of the use of bikes without a helmet. Tel Aviv Finance
Committee, supra note 180, at 10.
194. About
Capital
Bikeshare,
CAPITAL
BIKESHARE
https://www.capitalbikeshare.com/about (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
195. Id.
196. NAT’L CAPITAL REGION TRANSP. PLANNING BD., BICYCLE AND PEDESTRIAN
PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (2010), available at
http://www.mwcog.org/uploads/pub-documents/o15fW1g20101110111248.pdf; About
Capital Bikeshare, supra note 194.
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As in Washington, D.C., in Montreal the pattern of local
fragmentation engendered a plan promoted not by the city itself.
However, since Montreal’s pattern of local fragmentation is distinct
from that of Washington, D.C., and characterized by special purpose
entities (the third form of fragmentation reviewed in Part II.B)—
Montreal employed a different non-city mechanism for adopting and
implementing its bike-share plan. Montreal mandated that the plan
be developed and implemented by a metropolitan organization that
manages the area’s paid parking system: Société en commandite
Stationnement de Montréal.197 The latter is an agent of the Board of
Trade of Metropolitan Montreal, a private consortium of businesses
set to promote local growth. The city picked this technique in order
to rely on the expertise of the organization that had developed and
was operating computer-based parking meters. In addition, the city
could thereby insulate its own coffers from the costs of the project.
The reliance on a non-city actor raised some legal concerns: the city’s
Auditor General reckoned that this was a prohibited delegation of
government power.198 Later agreements between the city and Société
en commandite Stationnement de Montréal remedied this original
deficiency by assuring public control.199
The process leading to the adoption of Montreal’s Bixi is not only
an example of the effect of the jurisdiction’s pattern of local
fragmentation, but also of the potential influence of the jurisdiction’s
pattern of micro-localism (Part II’s third axis of legal difference).
Because of the formal micro-localism embedded into the city’s
institutional architecture, the city government was not sure whether it
held the power to adopt a plan, fearing that the authority to do so lied
with the individual arrondissements. The city sought the advice of its
general counsel, who dispelled the concerns and cleared the plan for
adoption on the local, rather than micro-local, level.200

197.
198.
199.
200.

Montreal Exec. Comm. Res. CE07 1555 (Can. 2007).
BUREAU DU VÉRIFICATEUR GÉNÉRAL, supra note 182, at 77–80.

Id.

Counsel explained, in his opinion of July 20, 2007:
The purpose of implementing a public self-serve bicycle system is to
‘enhance citizens’ mobility and reduce the modal share of the automobile.’
In its 2007 transportation plan, the Ville de Montréal recognizes the bike as
‘an essential component of the current transportation system and intends to
break new ground with innovative measures to further encourage active
transportation’ . . . .
We are therefore of the opinion that a public self-serve bicycle system
represents much more than a recreational sport in the meaning of Article
141 of the Charter of the Ville de Montréal (R.S.Q., chapter C-11.4), which
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Conversely, in Shanghai the bike plan was—or rather, the bike
plans were—adopted by formal micro-local bodies.201 Instead of
pursuing adoption on the city level, where political hurdles might
have been more challenging, the local firm interested in operating
bike share plans (Forever Bicycle) persuaded some of the city’s
distinct districts to adopt bike share plans. In 2009, Minhang was the
first district to adopt such a program. It has since been followed by
Pudong, Xuhui, and Baoshan.202
Finally, when a city, rather than another local or micro-local body,
adopted the plan, the fourth axis of difference—respecting the
patterns of separation of powers within a city—inevitably affected the
manner of enactment. In many cities—for example, Chicago, Tel
Aviv, and Buenos Aires—the program was adopted by the city
council.203 However, in others, where the mayor is more powerful,
the executive took the lead. In Montreal, for example, the plan was
enacted by order of the city’s executive,204 but the latter did claim to
rely on the city’s transportation program, adopted by the legislature a
few years earlier.205 New York represents the most extreme example
of executive leadership: Citi Bike was adopted and implemented by
the mayor and the Department of Transportation which he controls,
while city council had to content itself with briefings.206

stipulates that the organization of recreational sports and sociocultural
activities are under the jurisdiction of the borough councils.
As there is no specific mention in the Charter as to who has jurisdiction
relative to such transportation activities (public self-serve bicycle system),
we must conclude that the City Council has jurisdiction, in accordance with
Article 84 of the Charter.
Id. at 81.
201. INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49, at 92.
202. Baoshan is the only one of these districts that did not hire Forever Bicycle as
the operator. See Rebecca Kanthor, Cycle City: Shanghai Ramps up Its Bike-Share
Schemes, CNN (Apr. 22, 2012), http://travel.cnn.com/shanghai/play/shanghai-gets-itsride-shanghai-rideshare-307485.
203. Regulatory Law No. 2.586, Dec. 11, 2008 (Arg.); Tel Aviv City Council
Minutes, at 62 (Feb. 8, 2010) (Isr.) (reporting that the Mayor asked the council to
approve the budget committee’s decision to adopt the plan); Chicago Bike Share
Plan Approved by City Council, CITY CHI. (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cdot/provdrs/bike/news/2012/apr/chicago_
bike_shareplanapprovedbycitycouncil.html.
204. Montreal Exec. Comm. Res. CE07 1555 (Can. 2007).
205. See VILLE DE MONTREAL, 2007 TRANSPORTATION PLAN, available at
http://ville.montreal.qc.ca/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PES_PUBLICATIONS_EN/PUBL
ICATIONS/2007_TRANSPORTATION_PLAN.PDF.
206. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NYC BIKE SHARE: DESIGNED BY NEW
YORKERS 7 (2013).
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As this section illustrated, while all the cities this Article reviews
surpassed the initial hurdle of adopting a bike-share plan, they
differed wildly in the process they had to go through in order to reach
this result, due to the legal differences between them detected in Part
II. A few cities had to allay concerns about their authority to adopt
the plan, and some encountered more difficulty than others in making
necessary adjustments to other general laws to facilitate the plan’s
viability. Some cities had the plan adopted or implemented by noncity local actors—an inter-local cooperative body or a special purpose
body. Some saw the plan adopted by micro-local bodies. And while
many required local legislative approval for the plan, some relied on
unilateral executive action. These early, and seemingly procedural,
variations later had far-reaching effects on key elements of the
adopted plan. Similarly, the impact of underlying differences
between local government law systems did not conclude at the time of
a plan’s adoption. We will see those later effects and impacts now.
B.

Funding of the Bike Share Plan

A crucial element of a bike-share plan is the manner in which it is
funded. The mode of funding influences many, if not all, of the plan’s
attributes: the physical infrastructure to be used (i.e., number and
quality of bikes and stations), the pricing scheme for users, the
technological sophistication of the system (e.g., the technology used
to track the location and number of bikes; anti-theft devices),
maintenance standards and plan flexibility (the shifting of bikes
between stations), and more. In the past year insufficient funding for
the local bike share plan has surfaced as a hotly debated problem in
many major cities. New York City’s plan was deemed “successful”
but financially “wobbly”;207 the sponsor of London’s program

207. Matt Flegenheirmer, Citi Bike System Successful, but Wobbly from the Start,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/nyregion/as-citi-bikeapproaches-anniversary-worries-abound.html. The system has been a success in
terms of its acceptance by users: within nine months of its adoption (counting an
exceptionally harsh winter) it topped seven million trips, and counted more than
100,000 buyers of annual membership—surpassing in those numbers programs
adopted elsewhere. Emily Badger, Why DC’s Bikeshare is Flourishing While New
York’s
is
Financially
Struggling,
WASH.
POST,
Apr.
1,
2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/01/why-docs-bikeshareis-flourishing-while-new-york-is-financially-struggling/.
Yet financially, it has
struggled badly. In March 2014, the program’s general manager resigned. Annie
Karni, General Manager of City’s Bike Share Program Resigns, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Mar. 26, 2014, 3:22 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/generalmanager-city-bike-share-program-resigns-blog-entry-1.1735642.
Reports have
emerged that the plan is in need of tens of millions of dollars. Laura Kusisto et al.,
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announced its withdrawal;208 Toronto was forced to take over its bikeshare plan after the operator could not repay its loans;209 Montreal’s
operator, already bailed out by the city in 2011, went bankrupt;210 and
in Barcelona (as in other Spanish cities)211 the government is no
longer capable of adequately supporting the system.212
As
commentators and experts have noted, many of these problems can
be traced to mistakes committed early on, when the funding scheme
was picked for the program.213 As this section shows, in most cities
that pick was a function of the legal structure of the relevant
jurisdiction, as reviewed in Part II.
Since bike share plans are not expected to be self-funding (i.e., they
can very rarely subsist on user fees alone),214 a source of funding for
the installation of the plan’s infrastructure and for its maintenance is
needed. The source can be private, public, or a combination thereof.
When private funds are the only resource utilized, as in New York
City, the system is operated by a licensee that relies on revenues from
corporate sponsorship and advertising to supplement those derived
from user fees (in New York, for example, Citibank bought the

Citi Bike, Needing Millions of Dollars, Looks for Help, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2013,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304256404579451770072629130.
208. See Sean Farrell, London Looking for a New Sponsor to Stump Up £37.5m
for Boris Bikes, GUARDIAN, June 2, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2014/jun/02/london-new-sponsor-boris-bikes-tfl-barclays-cycle-hire.
209. Oliver Moore, Toronto to Take over Struggling Bixi Bike-Share Program,
GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 4, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/
Bixi
toronto-to-take-over-struggling-bixi-bike-sharing-program/article15761883/;
Toronto Under New Management, Now Called “Bike Share Toronto”, MARKET
WIRED (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/bixi-torontounder-new-management-now-called-bike-share-toronto-1893948.htm.
210. See Nick Summers, Bike Sharing Crashes in Canada, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-0121/bike-sharing-crashes-in-canada.
211. INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49, at 125.
212. Barcelona had to resort to increasing the pricing for users, generating local
outcry. See Camilo Baquero, El Ayuntamiento insta a comprar bici en lugar de usar
el Bicing [The City Urges Buying Bikes Instead of Using the Bike Share Program],
EL PAIS, Oct. 19, 2012, http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2012/10/18/catalunya/1350587436_
402030.html (Spain).
213. E.g., Badger, supra note 207; Gabe Klein, What Is the Larger “Share” in
Bikeshare?, URB. LAND MAG. (Apr. 4, 2014), http://urbanland.uli.org/sustainability/
larger-share-bikeshare/. Klein was head of the Washington, D.C., and then Chicago,
transportation departments, when those cities adopted their bike-share plans. Klein,
supra.
214. INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49, at 49; Matthew Christensen
& Susan Shaheen, Can Bikeshare Systems Ever Stand on Their Own Two Wheels?,
CONVERSATION (Feb. 17, 2014), http://theconversation.com/can-bikeshare-systemsever-stand-on-their-own-two-wheels-22981. Only the D.C. system comes close.
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system’s naming rights).215 If public monies are drawn on, as in
Buenos Aires or Tel Aviv, the local government operating the system
channels funds into the plan as necessary to fill gaps between the
system’s costs and the revenues generated from user fees (in Buenos
Aires residents do not pay user fees at all).216 A mixed private-public
funding scheme can take several forms. The most straightforward
mixed scheme simply combines the private funding scheme with the
public one. Thus, London’s bike share plan is funded mostly by funds
from the city’s transportation department, Transport for London
(TfL), but also by sponsorship fees paid by Barclays Bank.217

215. The for-profit plan is a joint venture between New York City and NYC Bike
Share, LLC, a wholly-own subsidiary of Alta Bicycle Share, Inc. Bike Share, LLC is
responsible for all operating costs, and it funded the startup costs through the
sponsorship agreement it entered with Citigroup and a loan it secured from Goldman
Sachs. Kusisto, supra note 207; See Jennifer Peltz, Citi Bike Share Program Launches
with 6,000 Bikes Across New York City, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/27/citi-bike-share-program-launches_n_
3342202.html. According to the agreement, profits (if any) are to be shared 50/50
between NYC Bike Share, LLC and the City.
216. In Tel Aviv, the city contracted with an operator who is paid a fixed annual
fee by the city, and additional compensation if the plan does not generate certain predetermined revenues levels. Tel Aviv Finance Committee, supra note 180, at 8–9
(minor amendments to the contract were later made in Tel Aviv Finance Committee,
Decision 362, Minutes No. 19/10, at 1–2 (Mar. 9, 2010) (Isr.). Of course the city can in
turn sell advertisement rights to private entities. In Buenos Aires, for example, Citi
gave a $40 million grant to the city for startup in exchange for advertising at the
stations.
217. The overall initial cost of the system was expected to be £79 million. Barclays
made a deal with TfL in 2010 to provide a substantial investment—£25 million over
five years (or £5 million per year)—in exchange for branding and naming rights for
the system in that period. Barclays recently decided not to continue its support once
its initial contract with TfL expires (in summer 2015), so TfL is now looking for a new
sponsor to pay at least £5.5 million over seven years for the right to rebrand the
system. On top of the implementation cost, the annual operating cost of Barclays
Cycle Hire (as of 2013) is £24 million, £7.5 million of which has been covered by
revenues from fares and membership fees and £5.4 million of which has been covered
by private sponsors like Barclays Bank. Otherwise, the rest of the operating cost as
well as the initial cost of the system has been covered by TfL funds. See LONDON
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORT COMM., PEDAL POWER: THE CYCLE HIRE SCHEME AND
CYCLE
SUPERHIGHWAYS
12–20,
38–40
(2010),
available
at
http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/FINAL%20REPORT.pdf;
LONDON
CYCLE HIRE SCHEME, LONDON CYCLE SUPERHIGHWAYS, NAMING RIGHTS AND
SPONSORSHIP
AGREEMENT
(May
21,
2010),
http://tfl.gov.uk/cdn/static/
cms/documents/barclays-cycle-hire-and-superhighways-sponsorship-agreement.pdf;
TRANSPORT FOR LONDON, BARCLAYS CYCLE HIRE FREQUENTLY REQUESTED
STATISTICS 5 (2014), available at https://www.tfl.gov.uk/cdn/static/cms/documents/
bch-transparency-end-september-2014.pdf; TRANSPORT FOR LONDON, WRITTEN
SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED FOR THE TRANSPORT COMMITTEE’S REVIEW OF THE CYCLE
HIRE SCHEME AND CYCLE SUPERHIGHWAYS 20 (2010), available at
http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Full%20Doc.pdf.
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Another mixed scheme, first adopted by Paris for its groundbreaking
system (and accordingly used as template for other cities, such as
Mexico City), involves an exchange between the city and the system’s
private operator. The latter establishes and operates the system at its
expense, and in return the city grants it the unrelated rights to operate
billboards the city owns.218
A myriad of motives guides a city’s choice between these funding
options. The legal framework under which the city operates is central
among them, although often its effect is not apparent. Based on the
experience of the cities reviewed in this Article, two of the four major
characteristics of a local government law system, detected in Part II,
impact the likelihood that a funding scheme counting a meaningful
public component will be picked: patterns of local empowerment (the
first axis of difference, reviewed in Part II.A) and patterns of local
separation of powers (the fourth axis of difference, reviewed in Part
II.D).
Patterns of local empowerment within the relevant jurisdiction
have allowed some cities, but not others, to rely on public funding for
which they are not responsible—i.e., grants from a higher level of
government. In such cases, and for obvious political reasons, cities
have been much more willing to expend public monies (which are not
their own, after all) on the bike share plan. Thus, several cities in the
United States—such as Chicago and Washington, D.C.—relied, in
establishing their programs, on public funding through federal
grants.219 The public component in London’s mixed funding scheme
218. Vélib’ was established through a ten year contract between the city of Paris
and la société des mobiliers urbains pour la publicité et l’information, a subsidiary of
JCDecaux. John Ward Anderson, Paris Embraces Plan to Become City of Bikes,
WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/03/23/AR2007032301753.html. JCDecaux paid the start-up costs of $115 million
and operates the bike share program. Id. The city receives all revenue from the
program, as well as a fee of about $4.3 million per year. Id. In exchange, JCDecaux
was awarded control of (and all income from) 1628 city-owned billboards. Id. The
arrangement is very lucrative for JCDecaux. Estimates indicate that it generates
revenues of up to $80 million annually from the advertising contract. INST. FOR
TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49, at 129.
Mexico City adopted a similar model. The city shared the startup costs with
Clear Channel Outdoor Mexico (CCOM) (the government contributed 75 million
pesos: $5.7 million). CCOM keeps the revenues it collects from the users and pays
the city a fee of 250,000 pesos (about $20,000) per month (i.e., the private firm bears
all the risks). In exchange, CCOM received an Administrative Temporary Revocable
Permit to operate 150 outdoor advertising facilities in Mexico City, called marquees,
which are the pedestals with clocks located in main avenues. Contract No.
JUDAA/C-087/2009.
219. The startup costs of both programs were covered by the federal congestion
mitigation and air quality improvement program. 23 U.S.C. § 149 (2012). Both
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is derived from the budget of the city’s own transit department—
TfL—but like other local authorities in England, much of TfL’s
funding originates with the central government.220 Mexico City and
Buenos Aires relied (the former partially, the latter wholly) on local
government funds, but in both cases, in light of those cities’ pattern of
local empowerment, local funds are in fact state—or in the Mexican
case, federal—funds.221
Cities’ abhorrence of using their own local funds is revealed by the
behavior of cities that, due to their patterns of legal empowerment,
were unable to tap state or federal level funding, yet still desired to
employ public funding. Such cities often refrained from forthrightly
utilizing local funds. As mentioned, Paris preferred to transfer
property to the system’s operator, rather than funds.222 Montreal,
instead of directly funding the plan, guaranteed loans obtained by the
special authority operating the system.223
The enlistment of public funding for the bike share plan is, to some
extent, a function of the patterns of local empowerment characteristic
of the relevant jurisdiction and the resulting availability of state or
federal (rather than local) resources. The likelihood that public funds
be poured into the project is also impacted by the patterns of local
separation of powers, as reviewed in Part II.D. The most important
factor in this regard is the standing of the mayor vis-à-vis the local
legislature, and the inevitable desire of mayors to evade legislative
supervision or political give-and-take with council members. The
interaction of this constant political desire and the variable legal
structure generates three distinct scenarios.

systems then rely, to a limited extent, on local sources of funding for shortfall in the
operating budget. For example, in Chicago (which received $18 million in federal
funding), according to the contract reached with the operator of the system, after the
first year of operation (during which the city is entitled to 90% of profits and
responsible for 90% of losses) the operator will be responsible for any annual
operating loss, up to a cap negotiated yearly with the city. The city funded its part of
the plan using Tax Increment Finance funds (to the tune of $5.5 million). See AUTH.
OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHI., JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO ILLINOIS 23783, 23785–86 (Apr. 18, 2012).
220. See How We Are Funded, TRANSPORT FOR LONDON, http://www.tfl.gov.uk/
corporate/about-tfl/how-we-work/how-we-are-funded (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
221. Mexico City’s own legislative body does not control local funds anyway.
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 122,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 10 de Febrero de 2014 (Mex.)
222. See Anderson, supra note 218 and accompanying text.
223. See Montreal City Council Res. CM10 0944 (Can. 2010). Even for this act,
given the jurisdiction’s restraining patterns of local empowerment, the city had to
seek approval from a provincial minister. BUREAU DU VÉRIFICATEUR GÉNÉRAL,
supra note 182.
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First, in cities where the power of the legislature is confined mostly
to control of the budget, the mayor can act unilaterally as long as no
public funds are conscripted. Hence in New York, where the mayor
alone controls the executive branch, Mayor Michael Bloomberg was
able to avoid a council debate over the plan once he decided to
forsake public funding.224 The plan was then adopted by the city’s
department of transportation, accountable solely to the mayor.225
Second, in cities where the legislature does not command the
budget, the executive can achieve sole control over the plan even
when turning to the public coffers. London’s plan is closely
associated, in the eyes of the public and the media, with Mayor Boris
Johnson (though the plan was originally conceived by his predecessor,
and a strong character in his own right, Ken Livingston).226 And
indeed, “Boris Bikes,” as they are affectionately known,227 were
introduced by the city’s department of transportation, TfL, which the
mayor controls.228 Yet the Mayor did not shy away from securing
some public funding for his personal project. Unlike his New York
counterpart, London’s mayor dominates the budgetary process (recall
that the legislature can only reject the annual budget suggested by the
mayor by a two thirds majority),229 and consequently the reliance on
public funds did not jeopardize the mayor’s complete control of the
bike share plan.
Finally, in cities where the legislature’s power extends beyond the
budgetary process and into the management of the executive

224. See INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49, at 100–01; Christensen
& Shaheen, supra note 214.
225. See Matt Flegenheimer, For Bloomberg and Bike-Sharing Program, the Big
Moment Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/27/
nyregion/on-eve-of-bike-sharing-debut-watching-for-a-fiasco-or-a-success.html.
226. See Hugh Muir, Revealed: How the Cycling Mayor Re-Wrote History for
Paxo’s Last Interview, GUARDIAN, June 19, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/
politics/2014/jun/19/hugh-muir-diary-boris-bikes-paxman.
227. See Owen Duffy, Glasgow Follows London’s Boris Bikes by Launching Public
Bike Rental Scheme, GUARDIAN, June 24, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uknews/scotland-blog/2014/jun/24/glasgow-bike-rental-scheme; Boris Bikes ‘Good for
Health of Users’, Study Says, BBC (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/health26171326.
228. See Agreement Relating to provision of services for the London Cycle Hire
Scheme, between Transport Trading Limited and Serco Limited (2009), available at
http://www.tfl.gov.uk/cdn/static/cms/documents/london-cycle-hire-schemeagreement-redacted-version.pdf.
229. See Greater London Authority Act, 1999, c. 29, sch. 6 (Eng.). In New York
City, the council must approve the budget and it also has the power to make
amendments to it. Budget Process, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, http://council.nyc.gov/html/
about/budget.shtml (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
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agencies, the mayor cannot dominate the bike share plan even if
public funds are renounced. Hence the mayor is not incentivized to
forego them. The result is that an institutionally weakened mayoralty
can lead to the use of public funds. Thus in Tel Aviv, where the
council controls not only the budget but also the administrative
agencies,230 and where therefore the mayor could not have dominated
the process even if public funds were not used, there was no reason to
forsake them.
These three distinct experiences demonstrate that public funds are
less likely to be used when their introduction into the program will
interfere with the mayor’s effort to monopolize the decision-making
processes respecting the plan. Throughout the world, bike share
plans have been closely associated with individual, strong-willed,
mayors.231 Such mayors’ effectiveness and stranglehold on policymaking is inevitably conditioned on their legal relationship with local
legislatures. Thus along with the pattern of local empowerment
which may or may not render non-local public funds accessible, local
separation of powers is a local legal filter through which general, and
natural, political urges must pass before generating a funding policy.
C.

Placement of the Bike Share’s Docking Stations

Docking stations are the backbone of a bike share plan. They
determine the availability of bikes and the plan’s reach. Washington,
D.C.’s first experiment with bike sharing failed, allegedly because of
the limited distribution of stations (which did not extend beyond the
city’s boundaries).232 The location of the stations determines who will
be the primary users of the system: commuters or tourists, affluent
230. See Tel Aviv Finance Committee, supra note 180.
231. In addition to the plans in London and New York, Paris’s plan is also
accredited to the city’s dominant mayor at the time of its acceptance, Bertrand
Delanoë. See Velib à Paris, un succès politique pour Delanoë, POLITIQUE.NET (Aug.
30, 2007), http://www.politique.net/2007083002-le-succes-de-velib-a-paris.htm (Fr.).
Tel Aviv’s plan is also accredited to its Mayor, Ron Holdai. E.g., Yossi Klein,
Meazben Ve’yail o Nechmad Ve’nirpeh? [Annoying and Ineffective or Nice and
Lazy?], HAARETZ (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium1.2142186 (Isr.) (arguing that while the other candidates for the mayoralty are
interested in social issues or criticizing the mayor, the incumbent is concerned with
his key policy of bike promotion); Ilanit Hayut, Eash Hashivuk Shel April: Rosh
Iryat Tel-Aviv Ron Holdai [Marketing Man of April: Tel Aviv’s Mayor Ron Holdai],
GLOBES (May 5, 2013), http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000841387
(Isr.) (designating the mayor “marketer of the month” for his success in promoting
his bike-share plan, adopted two years earlier).
232. See Lydia DePillis, R.I.P. SmartBike, Good Riddance, WASH. CITY PAPER,
Sept. 16, 2010, http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2010/09/
16/r-i-p-smartbike-good-riddance/. Smartbike was introduced in 2008. Id.
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residents or weaker segments of the local population, etc. The
stations are also the most visible element of the program: more than
any other component of a bike-share, they in fact change the city’s
landscape. The stations are the plan’s element that all residents
inevitably are confronted with in their daily lives. As a result, stations
have been the only component of the bike share plan litigated in
courts.233 This section will investigate how a city’s local government
law system dictates these all important station placement decisions.
Since at stake is the geographical scope of the plan, decisions
respecting the distribution of stations are highly impacted by the legal
factors that divide control over local space: i.e., patterns of local
fragmentation and patterns of micro-localism (the topics of Parts II.B
and II.C). Patterns of local fragmentation most prominently affect
the ability to integrate the plan with other cities and/or other transit
systems. The ability to share the plan with other cities in the
metropolitan area is determined by the local government law system’s
attitude toward relationships between cities. Stations will be placed
throughout the metropolitan area, and not solely within the adopting
city, if the jurisdiction’s patterns of local fragmentation facilitate and
incentivize inter-local agreements between cities—as in Chicago234 as
opposed to New York.235 Or if they establish an inter-local body that
can coordinate the plan—as in Washington, D.C.236
The ability to integrate the plan with other transit systems is, in
turn, a function of the local government law regime’s attitude towards
functional fragmentation.
If the jurisdiction’s pattern of
fragmentation checks subject-field fragmentation (i.e., fragmentation
into special districts), and centralizes control over all transit systems

233. In New York, residents filed suits for bodily injuries they claimed were
suffered because of the location and design of the stations. See Rebecca Harshbarger
& Natalie O’Neill, Citi Bike Hit with First Lawsuits, N.Y. POST, Oct. 2, 2013,
http://nypost.com/2013/10/02/citi-bike-hit-with-first-ever-injury-lawsuits/. Other cities
have faced legal challenges over bike share stations as well. See infra note 244
(discussing litigation in London); infra notes 249–52 and accompanying text
(discussing litigation in Chicago).
234. Chicago and two of its closest suburbs, Evanston and Oak Part, have applied
for state grants to expand Divvy into those suburbs. See Memorandum from Suzette
Robinson et al., Dir. of Pub. Works, to Honorable Mayor et al., City of Evanston
(Aug. 12, 2013).
235. This summer the cities of Hoboken, Weehawken, and Jersey City, located
across the Hudson River from Manhattan, will inaugurate their own bike-share
plan—one that will not be integrated with Citi Bike. See Andrew Tangel, Three N.J.
Cities Eye Bike-Sharing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303824204579425853318799962.
236. Where stations are spread beyond the city proper. See supra note 234 and
accompanying text.

2014] COMPARATIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 183
in one local body, stations will be more easily placed to render the
bike share a coherent part of the local public transit system. Since
Mexico City (i.e., the Distrito Federal) operates its own bus and
subway systems, it integrated the bike share stations with transit
stops.237
Conversely, when the jurisdiction does embrace subject area
fragmentation, and the city does not control its transit system, the
potential for interface between the bike share and other modes of
transit is limited. In such legal regimes the most the city can do is to
unilaterally attempt to place docking stations near public transit hubs.
Thus New York City’s guidelines successfully attempted to place
stations near subway exits, major bus stops, and ferry lines, though
the city is not in charge of those public transit systems.238 But in such
a legal environment the city cannot experiment with more
imaginative forms of inter-transit integration for which unilateral
action is inadequate. For example, it is highly unlikely that New York
City will follow Hangzhou and allow residents to use the same card to
ride a bus and then pick a bike at a docking station after
disembarking.239 Or that it will imitate Guangzhou and adjust the
location of bus rapid transit infrastructure to the needs of the bike
share plan.240
Legal fragmentation into special districts hence affects station
placement by splintering control over modes of public transit. It
further does so by removing certain spaces from direct city control.
London’s TfL must, for example, apply for planning permission from
the Royal Parks if it seeks to place a docking station within one of the
parks located in the city.241

237. See SECRETARÍA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE GOBIERNO DEL DISTRITO FEDERAL,
supra note 61, at 27. The city even added a docking station that was not in the
original plan to accommodate the requirements of one of its bus lines.
238. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, BIKE-SHARE OPPORTUNITIES IN NEW
YORK 95 (2009). A recent study found that indeed seventy-two percent of all Citi
Bike stations are within a five minute walk of a subway station. LILY GORDONKOVEN & NOLAN LEVENSON, RUDIN CTR. FOR TRANSP. MGMT. & POLICY, CITI BIKE
TAKES NEW YORK 8 (Sarah M. Kaufman ed., 2014).
239. See INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49, at 25.
240. Id. at 59.
241. The Secretary of State for the Department of Culture, Media, and Sport
manages the parks under powers set out in section 22 of the Crown Lands 1851 Act,
which transferred management of the parks from the monarch to the government.
Crown Lands Act, 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 42, § 22 (Eng.). The Secretary has
recognized the Royal Parks Board, whose members are appointed by the mayor of
London, as an advisory body. Royal Parks Management Agreement 2012–2015, pt. 2,
§ 5.1 (“The [Royal Parks Board] is an advisory body and has a role in the strategic
oversight of The Royal Parks.”).

184

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

The choice of locations for docking stations is thus highly
dependent on the local government law system’s patterns of local
fragmentation. It is also impacted by its patterns of micro-localism.
A question that a local government implementing a bike share plan
must contemplate is to what extent should it involve residents,
through micro-local mechanisms, in decisions respecting the
placement of stations in their midst. Cities differ in the answer they
supply to this question in accordance with the degree and manner
(formal and informal, direct and indirect) by which they recognize
micro-localism, as reviewed in Part II.C.
In a city where the micro-local formal body is almost fully
autonomous—where it may even be viewed as an independent city—
the micro-local has full control over the program. As already
mentioned, in Shanghai bike share plans were adopted by individual
districts, and, as a result, the location of stations is directed by these
micro-local bodies.242 Each system is limited in its coverage to one
specific district (in other words, Shanghai does not truly have a bikeshare plan; it has several plans, each operating separately in its own
area).243
Shanghai, naturally, represents the extreme case, where, arguably,
the micro-local replaces the local. In cities where there is clear
separation between local and micro-local, and the latter is subservient
to the former, the micro-local often still plays a key role in decisions
respecting the location of the stations for the bike share plan adopted
by the local. This is particularly true if the micro-local is a formal,
and empowered, level of government. In London, where the elected
borough governments exercise extensive general legislative and
regulatory powers, their involvement with the city-adopted bike share
plan is focused on the stations’ placement. London’s TfL works
closely with the boroughs and applies for planning permission from
the host borough for each docking station it builds. Generally, the
boroughs are supportive of the initiatives, but in several cases they
did veto docking stations.244

242. See supra notes 148–55 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 148–55 and accompanying text
244. See TRANSPORT FOR LONDON, CYCLING REVOLUTION LONDON END OF YEAR
REVIEW 2010 at 42 (2010) (showing general support for docking stations);
TRANSPORT FOR LONDON, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST FOI-0371-1314
(2013), available at https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/barclays_cycle_hire_
docking_stat; Transparency, TRANSPORT FOR LONDON, http://www.tfl.gov.uk/
corporate/transparency/#on-this-page-5 (last visited June 18, 2014). As of 2013, only
two docking station approvals have been challenged in the courts, but no lawsuits
have been successful.
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Other cities with formal, yet less powerful, micro-local bodies have
chosen to bypass those bodies in placement decisions. The communas
play no role in Buenos Aires’s program, and Paris’s arrondissements
are bystanders in the process: local residents are solely advised by
signage that a station is to be constructed.245 In cities where the
formal micro-local bodies are administrative or advisory, their role,
not surprisingly, is similarly limited. Mexico City’s delegaciones were
afforded no role in the EcoBici program, even though its coverage
was explicitly focused on specific delegaciones.246 New York City’s
Department of Transportation did a bit more to incorporate its
formal, yet advisory, micro-local bodies into the process.
Presentations were held for the community boards, and a website was
set up where anyone could vote for, or suggest, a station location.247
This diluted avenue for micro-local participation implemented in a
city with formal, but non-political, micro-local bodies was not
dramatically different from that pursued in a city with the still weaker
version of micro-local bodies: those that are informal. Like New
York, Chicago conducted presentations to its voluntary, informal,
neighborhood associations.248 In addition, the host ward’s alderman
was asked to approve each Divvy bike station before its

245. Proposed sites for the stations are approved by the city’s Department of
Architecture and Heritage Service; the detailed plans and locations of the terminals
are approved by the roads department; residents are given notice of construction of a
docking station, but are not consulted or allowed to intervene. Before each station is
constructed, small information posters and panels are put up for local residents at the
entrances to apartment buildings, in local businesses, and at the construction site
itself. The Mairie de Paris also set up an extramunicipal commission composed of
various local authorities and associations (e.g., police department, local transport
authorities, Ile-de-France Council, etc.) to advise the city on bicycle policy. Press
Release, Mairie de Paris, Thousands of Self-Service Bicycles Real Freedom! Bicycles
Everywhere, Bicycles for Everybody! (2007), available at http://www.gtkp.com/assets/
uploads/20091127-145510-86-Dossier%20de%20presse%20Anglais%5B1%5D.pdf.
246. See SECRETARÍA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE GOBIERNO DEL DISTRITO FEDERAL,
supra note 64, at 27–31. The same was, obviously, true in most consolidated cities
that do not recognize formal sub-local bodies or indirect micro-local legal challenges.
Placement determinations there have been completely centralized. Tel Aviv
excluded neighborhood residents from the decision. In fact, some city council
members argued that the issue should not even be discussed by the council members
themselves: this “professional” (as opposed to “policy”) decision should be left, as it
was, to central administrators. Tel Aviv City Council Minutes, at 124–31 (Mar. 22,
2010) (Isr.).
247. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 206, at 6; see, e.g., NYC Bike Share
Suggestion Archive, N.Y.C. DEP’T TRANSP., http://a841-tfpweb.nyc.gov/bikeshare/
suggestion-archive/ (last visited June 18, 2014).
248. See, e.g., Justin Haugens, Rogers Parkers Discuss Plans for Divvy Stations,
Greenway, STREETSBLOG CHI. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://chi.streetsblog.org/2014/04/22/
rogers-parkers-discuss-plans-for-divvy-stations-greenway/.

186

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

construction.249 Chicago’s acknowledgement of informal microlocalism did not end there, however. Chicago had to contend with the
most indirect form of micro-localism: a neighbors’ lawsuit. The suit,
enabled by current trends in American law respecting neighbors’
challenges, was brought by residents who claimed that a station
carried detrimental aesthetic effects, thus reducing property values.250
Though no temporary injunction was issued,251 the city decided to
settle the case by moving the controversial station.252
Like the fashion in which the plan is adopted and funded, the
scheme for spreading and placing its stations is determined by the
local system’s legal characteristics.
Patterns of fragmentation
determine whether the stations will reach beyond municipal
boundaries and how effective their integration with other transit
systems will be. In addition, patterns of micro-localism determine
how, if at all, input from neighborhoods will be taken into account in
the placement process.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Bike share plans, the quintessential uniform policy of the global
city, as described in Part I, emerge from Part III as programs that
differ in many of their important details: adoption, funding, and
geographical implementation, due to legal variations between
jurisdictions, explored in Part II. This concluding Part of the Article
briefly reviews potential ramifications of this analysis, and
acknowledges its limitations.
Can this Article be read as a “best practices guide”? Should it be
viewed as an attempt at adding a legal component to the guidebooks
respecting the recommended physical and economic characteristics
for a bike share plan?253 “Yes” and “no.” “No,” because the Article
249. See CHI. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CHICAGO STREETS FOR CYCLING PLAN 2020 16
(2012), available at http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/cdot/bike/
general/ChicagoStreetsforCycling2020.pdf.
250. See Mitch Smith, Condo Residents Go to Court over Divvy Bike Sharing
Station, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-0822/news/chi-divvy-bike-sharing-lawsuit-20130821_1_bike-sharing-program-divvycondo-residents; Steven Vance, Injunction to Remove Divvy Station Denied, but
Lawsuit Can Continue, STREETSBLOG CHI. (Aug. 19, 2013), http://chi.streetsblog.org/
2013/08/29/injunction-to-remove-divvy-station-denied-but-lawsuit-can-continue/.
251. See Vance, supra note 250.
252. John Greenfield, Divvy NIMBYs’ Bike-Share Nightmare Is Over: Lakeview
Station Relocated, STREETSBLOG CHI. (May 8, 2014), http://chi.streetsblog.org/2014/
05/08/divvy-nimbys-long-nightmare-is-over-lakeview-station-relocated/
253. Current literature recommending bike share plans advises that a plan be
adjusted to a city’s physical layout, population size, and even culture; yet until now
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does not embrace a specific model for a bike share plan or endorse
any legal reforms to local government laws to facilitate such a model.
“Yes,” because the Article highlights the legal considerations that
must be taken into account when formulating a suggested model for a
bike share plan. In other words, the Article does not advocate, for
example, broader reliance on public funding for bike shares or
reinforcement of mayors’ or city councils’ legal powers in local
government systems. At the same time, it does argue that when a
local legislature controls local funds but not other elements of the
local administrative process, public local funding is unlikely to be
made available.
International policy organizations, or local
reformers, who advocate reliance on public funding for bike-shares,
must take this reality into account.
Similarly, they must tailor their policy recommendations to the
interests and preferences of the authority that actually holds the
power to implement the recommended plan in light of local laws in
the specific city—regardless of the merits of those existing laws or of
the bike-share policy recommendations. Even when the desirability
of a certain attribute of a bike-share plan is hardly questionable, the
prospects that the attribute be effectuated in a given city will depend
on relevant local legal patterns. For example, the integration of the
plan with other modes of transit or its expansion to correspond to
natural, rather than municipal, metropolitan boundaries depends on
the form of local fragmentation that the particular local government
law system perpetuates.
This mode of thinking could assist not only those committed to
bike share plans’ spread and perfection; it should also serve as a
blueprint for future works in comparative local government law. The
insights of the global city and international local government law
literature are extremely illuminating and useful. There is no denial
that the city is intertwined with the world—economically, socially,
and legally—more than ever before. As the astoundingly rapid
spread of bike share plans demonstrates, global pressures and trends,
and also global connections and organizations, lead to the local
adoption of common policies. Even so, those common global policies
are imported into preexisting local government law systems that are
not common. The common policies will inevitably have to be
adjusted to the most impactful un-commonalities between those
systems, many of which were highlighted in Part II of this Article.

the need to deal with variation in local laws has been ignored. E.g., INST.
TRANSP. & DEV. POLICY, supra note 49, at 10–13.
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Chronicling, as was done in this Article, and, maybe even more
importantly, predicting, the ways in which these adjustments are
made, are important tasks for works in comparative local government
law inspecting other global policies or problems.254
The approach suggested here thus has much promise, but it is
important to remain aware of its limits, particularly those pertaining
to its aspiration at fully contextualizing global phenomena, trends,
and policies. While this Article tries to describe differing local
government legal regimes without preconceptions of a baseline,
several of the choices in constructing the typology of local
government law systems in Part II may have been tinted by its
immersion in American legal concepts. Thus, for example, a valid
argument could be made that Shanghai should not have been
considered to be a city with its districts functioning as micro-local
bodies; rather, the districts should have been viewed as cities and
Shanghai as a regional body. A similar claim could be made
respecting the Greater London Authority and the London
boroughs.255
Elsewhere, when discussing patterns of local
empowerment, the Article relies on the traditional distinction
prevalent in American law between the local power to initiate
policies, and the threat that, once adopted, those policies be
preempted by state-level acts (i.e., the distinction between the local
power of initiative and the local right to immunity).256 In systems
such as those prevalent in Israel and China, where any local act
requires approval by the upper levels of government,257 this
distinction may be artificial.
An even more troubling aspect of the Article’s imperfect sensitivity
to the peculiarities of the local is its inability to account for variation
in culture—legal and political—as distinct from variation in
institutional design. Places differ not only in their legal systems, but
also in the culture that draws for local participants the contours of the
254. For example, uniform regulation of ride share services, offered worldwide by
the same providers, is currently being promoted by those providers and others
(including the market players threatened by them, such as taxi drivers), and often
considered by different cities. Research could examine how such regulation—of the
same service often proffered by the same firm—may be pursued in different legal
regimes.
255. Gerald E. Frug, Empowering the City: London/New York, URB. OMNIBUS
(Feb. 17, 2010), http://urbanomnibus.net/2010/02/empowering-the-city-london-newyork/ (“New York City’s government in many ways is more comparable to London’s
boroughs than it is to the Greater London Authority.”).
256. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 167 (5th ed. 2010).
257. See supra notes 87–90, 173 and accompanying text.
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possible and acceptable within those systems.
These cultural
differences—not only the legal ones—influence participants’ ability to
adopt and design policies. Thus, for example, while the two cities’
differing separation-of-local-powers schemes affected London’s
decision to expend government funds on the bike share plan as
opposed to New York’s choice to forego them, the Article cannot,
and does not desire to, argue that other factors were not also at play.
Due to past customs and contemporary trends, few would be
surprised to learn that London was more willing than New York to
rely on public action and investment.258 Similarly, the different forms
of local fragmentation prevalent in Washington, D.C., as compared to
Tel Aviv, affected the former’s ability, as opposed to the latter’s
inability, to situate docking stations throughout its metropolitan area.
At the same time, so did the long-standing tradition of inter-local
cooperation in the Washington, D.C., area, a tradition wholly absent
in the Tel Aviv area.259
History and culture not only exert an influence alongside legal
institutions; they also interact with those institutions. That interaction
is multi-faceted. Existing institutions sustain local political culture,
but often that same culture was originally, at least partially,
responsible for those institutions’ creation and design.260 New York
City’s laws may facilitate privatization and the rise of a strong,
politically independent mayor, but they may well have been molded
in this way precisely because local culture supports privatization and a
strong, politically independent local leadership.261 This Article’s
258. See, e.g., E.S. Savas, Introduction to PRIVATIZATION FOR NEW YORK:
COMPETING FOR A BETTER FUTURE, A REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION 3 (E.S. Savas ed., 1992) (discussing New
York City’s penchant for privatization).
259. Most prominently, in the 1990s, Ramat Gan, a city bordering Tel Aviv, used
subsidies and tax abatements to attract corporate headquarters from Tel Aviv. The
result is that much of the area referred to today as Tel Aviv’s downtown is actually in
Ramat Gan. Another city on Tel Aviv’s outskirts, Bat Yam, filed a suit with the
Israeli Supreme Court in March 2014, demanding that the Minister of the Interior
appoint a committee to reconsider the division of revenue between Bat Yam, Tel
Aviv, and two other cities. It argued the amount of commercial and industrial space
under its control is disproportionately limited. HCJ 2245/14 City of Bat Yam v.
Minister of the Interior (filed Mar. 26, 2014) (Isr.).
260. See, e.g., Jide O. Nzelibe, Our Partisan Foreign Affairs Constitution, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 838, 853 (2013).
261. On the lengthy history of a strong executive in New York City and its
incorporation into the different charters under which the city has operated, see
Joseph P. Viteritti, The Tradition of Municipal Reform: Charter Revision in
HISTORICAL CONTEXT, IN RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE
REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM 16, 16–20 (Frank J. Mauro & Gerald
Benjamin eds., 1989).
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analysis cannot determine which preceded which—culture or law—or
which is more impactful.
This Article focuses on law, but it does not intend to downplay the
role of local political culture. Local culture is central to policymaking; the Article’s sole and modest claim is that so is a local
government law system.
CONCLUSION
When Citi Bike’s blue bikes made their initial appearance on the
streets of New York City, a member of the editorial board of the Wall
Street Journal sounded the alarm bells: “totalitarianism” was taking
over New York.262 As some speculated, this was a way of expressing
concern over the arrival of French invaders.263 The warning that the
bike-share plan was the first sign of the demise of the capitalistic
order and its replacement with a European order was somewhat
overblown. It betrayed a reflective objection to the new and “unAmerican.” At the same time, surprisingly, these prophets of doom
clutching to the old, local American share much with the boosters of
the global city who believe that there is no such thing as a purely
American local or a purely American city.264 The two camps assume
that the bike share plan is basically non-local: it is French, or it is
global. They fail to see that the plan is, at its heart, local. It is a New
York plan, not a Paris plan or a global plan. For example, it is one of
the few bike share plans in the world that employs no public funds,
and it is a plan designed with the knowledge that in New York, more
than anywhere else, residents can head to court to contest the
location of a docking station.265 These, and many other peculiar
attributes of the plan, owe to the legal realities against which New
York City—but not Paris, or any other global city—adopted a bike
share plan. The original idea of the modern bike share is undeniably
262. See Dorothy Rabinowitz, Opinion: Death by Bicycle, WALL ST. J. (May 31,
2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/video/opinion-death-by-bicycle/C6D8BBCEB405-4D3C-A381-4CA50BDD8D4D.html (responding to the question of why the
city council thought a bike share was a good idea by stating “[d]o not ask me to enter
the mind of the totalitarians running the city”).
263. Dan Amira, Why Conservatives Hate Citi Bike So Much, in One Venn
Diagram, N.Y. MAG., June 5, 2013, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/
venn-diagram-why-conservatives-hate-citi-bike.html.
264. See supra Part I.A. Almost fifty years ago, Norman Mailer memorably wrote,
“New York is one of the capitals of the world . . . . Perhaps [Chicago] is the last of
the great American cities.” NORMAN MAILER, MIAMI AND THE SIEGE OF CHICAGO:
AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC CONVENTIONS OF
1968 at 85 (1968).
265. See Shoked, supra note 146.
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French and global. The law remains decidedly American and New
York. Therefore, as a real-world policy, and not a mere idea, the bike
share plan inevitably must also be American and New York.

